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1  (a)  As a man's judgement about value, so, in the last resort, must his judgement about economics.  Value is the essence of things in 
economics.  Its laws are to political economy what the law of gravity is to mechanics.  Every great system of political economy up till now has 
formulated its own peculiar view on value as the ultimate foundation in theory of its applications to practical life, and no new effort at reform 
can have laid an adequate foundation for these applications if it cannot support them on a new and more perfect theory of value (Wieser 
1893, p xxx). 
  (b) In economics the most fundamental of these central problems is the theory of value. The theory of value must explain how the 
comparative values of different goods and services are established. Until that problem is solved, it is not possible to analyse for scientific 
purposes what will be produced and in what quantities, how the resources will be employed in producing the menu of outputs, and how the 
resources will be valued. Without a theory of value the economist can have no theory of international trade nor possibly a theory of money. 
This central problem of value does not change in its essential content if one seeks to explain values in rural or urban societies, or in 
agricultural or industrial societies. Indeed, if the problem of value were so chameleon like as to alter its nature whenever the economic or 
political system altered, each epoch in economic life would require its own theory, and short epochs would get short-lived theories (Stigler 
1982, p 61).  
2  If we are the only intelligent beings in the galaxy we should make sure we survive and continue. But we are entering an increasingly 
dangerous period of our history. Our population and our use of the finite resources of planet earth are growing exponentially along with our 
technical ability to change the environment for good or ill….  It will be difficult enough to avoid disaster in the next hundred years, let alone 
the next thousand or million.  Our only chance of long-term survival is not to remain inward looking on planet Earth but to spread out into 
space…. If we want to continue beyond the next hundred years, our future is in space (Hawking 2008). 
3  I want to persuade the reader, not just that the Darwinian world-view happens to be true, but that it is the only known theory that could, in 
principle, solve the mystery of our existence.... 
     For reasons that are not entiely clear to me, Darwinism seems more in need of advocacy than similarly established truths in other brances 
of science.  Many of us have no graps of quantum theory, or Einstein's theories of special and general relativity, but this does not in itself lead 
us to oppose these theories!  Darwinism, unlike 'Einsteinism', seems to be regarded as fair game for critics with any degree of ignorance.  I 
suppose one trouble with Darwinism, is that, as Jacques Monod perceptively remarked, everybody thinks he understands it.  It is, indeed, a 
remarkably simple theory; childishly so, one would have thought, in comparison with almost all of physics and mathematics.  In essence, it 
amounts to simply the idea that non-random reproduction, where there are hereditary variation, has consequences that are far-reaching if 
there is time for them to be cumulative.  But we have good grounds for believing that this simplicity is deceptive.  Never forget that, simple 
as the theory may seem, nobody thought of it until Darwin and Wallace in the mid nineteenth century, nearly 200 years after Newton's 
Principia, and more than 2,000 years after Eratosthenes measured the Earth.  How could such a simple idea go so long undiscovered by 
thinkers of the calibre of Newton, Galileo, Descartes, Leibnitz, Hume and Aristotle?  Why did it have to wait for two Victorian naturalists?  
What was wrong with philosophers and mathematicians that they overlooked it?  And how can such a powerful idea go still largely unabsorbed 
into popular consciousness? 
           It is almost as if the human brain were specifically designed to misunderstand Darwinism, and to find it hard to believe. [all italics 
Dawkins', 1986, p xiv-xv]. 
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TOUCHSTONE1 
 
 Nothing is easier than to admit in words the truth of the universal Struggle for Life,2 or 
more difficult—at least I have found it so—than constantly to bear this conclusion in 
mind.  Yet unless it be thoroughly engrained in the mind, I am convinced that the 
whole economy of nature, with every fact on distribution, rarity, abundance, 
extinction, and variation, will be dimly seen or quite misunderstood.  We behold the 
face of nature bright with gladness, we often see superabundance of food; we do not 
see, or we forget, that the birds which are idly singing round us mostly live on insects 
or seeds, and are thus constantly destroying life; or we forget how largely these 
songsters, or their eggs, or their nestlings, are destroyed by birds and beasts of prey; 
we do not always bear in mind, that though food may be now superabundant, it is not 
so at all seasons of each recurring year. 
      
 —Charles Darwin, On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation 
of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life, 1859 
                                                
1 Every man carries about him a touchstone... to distinguish... truth from appearances [Locke 1706, as cited in Popper 1963, p 3]. 
2 (a)  Our objective here is not to come up with a ponderous definition of war, but rather to capture its essence: Zweikampf, The Struggle for Life.  
War is actually nothing but a series of struggles.  It may be most helpful to think of the countless struggles that make up war as a single unit, 
to imagine two wrestlers locked in a hold, each struggling to impose his will, to attack, to defend against counter-attack, to render his 
opponent incapable of further resistance, and, both generally and ultimately, to survive the Struggle for Life [General Carl von Clauswitz, Vom 
Kriege, 1832.  The author would like to thank Simone Stahel-Webster for her assistance with this English translation; naturally, any errors or 
omissions may be attributed singularly to the author.]. 
 (b) When we reflect on this struggle, we may console ourselves with the full belief that death is generally prompt, and that the vigorous, the 
healthy, and the happy survive and multiply [Darwin 1859, p 37, as cited in Gould 2002, p 137]. 
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PORTRAIT OF THOMAS JEFFERSON1 
 
 
 
                                                
1  (a) 1788 portrait by John Trumbull (Depicts Jefferson at age 33). Oil on wood.  Image: The Thomas Jefferson Foundation. 
(b)  We…, the Representatives of the united States of America, in General Congress, Assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the 
world for the rectitude of our intentions, do, in the Name, and by Authority of the good People of these Colonies, solemnly publish and 
declare, That these United Colonies are, and of Right ought to be Free and Independent States…; and that as Free and Independent 
States, …have full Power to levy War, conclude Peace, contract Alliances, establish Commerce, and to do all other Acts and Things 
which Independent States may of right do.  And for the support of this Declaration, with a firm reliance on the protection of divine 
Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our Lives, our Fortunes and our sacred Honor (Jefferson 1776). 
(c) HAPPINESS IS generally considered an ultimate goal of life; virtually everybody wants to be happy. The United States Declaration of 
Independence of 1776 takes it as a self-evident truth that the "pursuit of happiness" is an "unalienable right, comparable to life and 
liberty. It follows that economics is - or should be - about individual happiness; in particular, how do economic growth, unemployment 
and inflation, and institutional factors such as governance affect individual well-being? (Frey & Stutzer 2002 p 402). 
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Matthew William Funk – 7 Fairway Drive – Stanhope – Prince Edward Island – Canada -  
 
 
 
The Honorable George  W. Bush        4 July 2008 
President of The United States of America 
The White House 
 
Dear Mr President: 
 
On 2 August 1939, Albert Einstein wrote the first of four letters1 to President Roosevelt because he realized that 
the rational solution to a global dilemma was not the optimal solution2 – yet he realized it was clearly the best solution to 
a difficult problem which threatened our nation and the future prospect of human life on Earth.  I have written this letter 
because I have discovered a solution to an even more complex and far greater threat to both our nation and the future of 
the human race. 
First, Sir, I will offer an illuminating anecdote and briefly relate how this solution came about. Sir Karl Popper 
was a young boy, the chaotic and tumultuous aftermath of  World  War I drew he and many others, of course, into the 
teachings of Marxist theory, which at the time, were being widely popularized and taught as “scientific socialism.”  But 
Popper grew suspicious, and began to wonder if “socialism” could in fact even be considered “scientific.”  As Popper 
recollected: 
I had accepted a dangerous creed uncritically, dogmatically.  The reaction made me… a sceptic.… 
     By the time I was seventeen I had become an anti-Marxist.  I realized the dogmatic character of the creed, and 
its incredible intellectual arrogance.  It was a terrible thing to arrogate to oneself a kind of knowledge which 
made it a duty to risk the lives of other people for an uncritically accepted dogma, or for a dream which might 
turn out not to be realizable.  It was particularly bad for an intellectual, for one who could read and think.  It was 
awfully depressing to have fallen into such a trap. 
     Once I had looked at it critically, the gaps and loopholes and inconsistencies in the Marxist theory became 
obvious…. 
                                                
1  See Einstein 1939. 
2 Life's toughest choices are not between GOOD AND BAD, but between BAD AND WORSE.  We call these choices between lesser evils.  We 
know that whatever we choose, something important will be sacrificed.  Whatever we do, someone will get hurt. Worst of all we HAVE to 
choose.  We cannot wait for better information or advice or some new set of circumstances.  We have to decide NOW, and we can be sure 
that there will be a price to pay.  If we do not pay it ourselves, someone else will. 
      These are the kinds of choices we face when dealing with terrorist threats.  If we do too little, we will get attacked again.  If we do too 
much, we will harm innocent people.  In making these choices, we never have enough information. Some sources exaggerate the threat; 
others minimize it. Nothing we are told is reliable and nothing we do is ever likely to strike the right balance (Ignatieff 2004, Preface).  
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     It took me some years of study before I felt with any confidence that I had grasped the heart of the Marxian 
argument….  Even then I had no intention of publishing my criticism of Marx, for anti-Marxism in Austria was a 
worse thing than Marxism… Of course I talked about it to my friends.  But it was not till sixteen years later, in 
1935, that I began to write about Marxism with the intention of publishing what I wrote.  As a consequence, two 
books emerged between 1935 and 1943 – The Poverty of Historicism and The Open Society and Its Enemies…. 
     Later, in my Logik der Forschung, I dealt with this problem very fully (p 43). 
 
Logic der Forschung (The Logic of Scientific Discovery), Popper’s magnum opus, gave us at long last a method for 
discerning between scientific and pseudo-science:  During his 1974 Sveriges Riksbank Prize Lecture, The Pretense of Knowledge, 
F.A. von Hayek suggested that  
If we are to safeguard the reputation of science, and to prevent the arrogation of knowledge based on a 
superficial similarity of procedure with that of the physical sciences, much effort will have to be directed toward 
debunking such arrogations, some of which have by now become the vested interests of established university 
departments. We cannot be grateful enough to such modern philosophers of science as Sir Karl Popper for giving 
us a test by which we can distinguish between what we may accept as scientific and what not - a test which I am 
sure some doctrines now widely accepted as scientific would not pass. 
 
Although I, too, had accepted a dangerous creed uncritically and dogmatically, my path of discovery followed 
many curious parallels to Popper’s search for a better world (and certainly leveraged his methodological insights), one 
significant difference between the two paths is that Popper ended up discovering his intuition was correct, but I, on the 
other hand, discovered that my intuition was incorrect.  And my great fear, Sir, is based in part of the effective 
popularization (by figures such as former vice-president Al Gore, Richard Branson, and media figures ranging from 
Leonardo de Caprio to Oprah  Winfrey) and uncritical acceptance of an equally dangerous creed regarding The Problem of 
Global  Warming.  
By the late 1990’s, I had been surfing the California coast – from the  Ventura County line to San Diego – for 
more than a decade, and to state that I was alarmed by the rapidly deteriorating coastal ecosystem would be a significant 
understatement.  I was primarily concerned with The Problem of Global  Warming (the Kyoto Protocol Dilemma in 
particular) and, furthermore, it seemed that, in general, our politico-economic development strategy were sub-optimal 
at best.  So I set sail in search of the theoretical politico-economic mechanisms which generated this misguided resource 
allocation:  I began the study of economics because I could not understand why neoclassical economics had not long-since 
been rejected, why it was taking so long for “ecological economics” to make ground in University economics 
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departments; however, after struggling for some years with the philosophical foundations of economics, I discovered that 
Robert Aumann was quite right when he suggested that “economics teaches us that things are not always as they appear.”1  
In his 2001 Sveriges Riksbank Prize autobiography, Joeseph Stiglitz offered: 
Growing up in Gary Indiana gave me, I think, a distinct advantage over many of my classmates who had grown 
up in affluent suburbs. They could read articles that argued that in competitive equilibrium, there could not be 
discrimination, so long as there are some non-discriminatory individuals or firms, since it would pay any such 
firm to hire the lower wage discriminated-against individuals, and take them seriously. I knew that discrimination 
existed, even though there were many individuals who were not prejudiced.  To me, the theorem simply proved 
that one or more of the assumptions that went into the theory was wrong; my task, as a theorist, was to figure 
out which assumptions were the critical ones;2  
 
and, 
 
although I grew up in a small farm-town in the vast sea of the great American cornbelt, 41 miles due south of 
Gary on U.S. Highway 41, my Indiana was not nearly as instructional as Stiglitz's Indiana.  But I have come to 
believe that islands, especially small islands with big problems (and small islands which model equally substantial 
solutions), may offer even more distinct advantages and more profound economic insights than those offered in 
Gary, Indiana.3 I have also come to the conclusion that there are very distinct advantages of exploring islands – 
including their problems and solutions – as an “outsider...”4  
     Islands are lighthouses5—beacons far brighter, far more representative, and far more descriptive than 
mathematical models.6 
Furthermore, these small islands offer insights which stand in stark contradistinction and diametrical opposition 
                                                
1 Ibid, p 351. 
2 Italics Stiglitz's 2001. 
3 Funk 2008a 
4 It is often outsiders who see a problem first.  This may be because an inventor is rightly keen to have his invention applied, and may therefore 
overlook its possibly undesirable consequences.  Thus, certain chemical inventions proved very successful against mosquitoes and other 
insects, but with the undesirable result that songbirds died of starvation.  The American naturalist Rachel Carson reported all this in her 
excellent book Silent Spring (Popper 1999, p 101). 
5 Islands are synecdoches: their understanding facilitates a ‘coming to grips’ with a more complex whole. They also act as advance indicators or 
extreme reproductions of what is future elsewhere. Crucial, new insights into evolutionary theory, and the realization of so much species 
differentiation on islands in modern zoogeography, are primarily due to the unwitting and haphazard stumbling of what, at first sight, may 
have appeared to be inconsequential, island-based, island-specific fieldwork. This includes such investigations as the study of Darwin’s finches 
on the Galapagos Islands (Darwin 1859...) or Alfred Wallace’s study of birds-of-paradise on the Aru Islands (Wallace, 1880)… The forays of 
Bronislaw Malinowski amongst the Trobriand… Islanders of Papua New Guinea (1922), Margaret Mead to Samoa… (1928; 1934) and 
Raymond Firth to Tikopia (1936) (Baldacchino 2007b, p 9). 
6 (a) Mathematicians may flatter themselves that they possess new ideas which mere human language is as yet unable to express.  Let them 
make the effort to express these ideas in appropriate words without the aid of symbols, and if they succeed, they will not only lay us laymen 
under a lasting obligation, but, we venture to say, they will find themselves very much enlightened during the process, and will even be 
doubtful whether the ideas as expressed in symbols had ever quite found their way out of the equations into their minds (Maxwell 1873, p 
400). 
 (b) Civilization advances by extending the number of important operations which we can perform without thinking about them.  This is of 
profound significance in the social field. We make constant use of formulas, symbols, and rules whose meaning we do not understand and 
through the use of which we avail ourselves of the assistance of knowledge which individually we do not possess. We have developed these 
practices and institutions by building upon habits and institutions which have proved successful in their own sphere and which have in turn 
become the foundation of the civilization we have built up (Hayek 1945, pp 519-530). 
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to most of those discovered by Professor Stiglitz.  In short, over the past decade I have struggled to develop a useful 
method for the analysis of complex systems (the complex system of life on earth in particular), analysis often referred to 
as nonlinear dynamics; and although some advances may be emerging in chaos theory, The Problem of Induction limits all 
mathematical methods to formulating solutions to the most pressing problem threatening the nonlinear dynamics of life 
on Earth.  But I have discovered that islands offer models for complex systems analysis of life on earth far more accurate, 
reliable, and descriptive than mathematical models,1 and thus my use of mathematics is more often than not from the 
opposite direction.2 
And after spending the past decade struggling with The Problem of Sustainable Economic Development, not only did I 
discover my intuition was incorrect, I managed to derived a solution to this rather complex problem in the process.  In 
order to highlight the neutrality of my approach, I should also disclose, Sir, that, on one hand, I am ashamed that, at 39 
years old, I have not once exercised my right as a U.S. citizen to vote;  however, on the other hand, I will also note that I 
am steeped in a tradition3 which does not take such decisions lightly, and, moreover, I now realize that by electing not to 
vote was the most rational (though admittedly less than optimal) decision, since, in hindsight, it seems I would have 
mistakenly voted against my personal interests, national interests, and even, as I see so clearly now, global interests (of 
which more to follow). 
Last month I delivered the first of three papers at the Åland International Institute of Comparative Island Studies 
                                                
1 (a) Civilization advances by extending the number of important operations which we can perform without thinking about them.  This is of 
profound significance in the social field. We make constant use of formulas, symbols, and rules whose meaning we do not understand and 
through the use of which we avail ourselves of the assistance of knowledge which individually we do not possess. We have developed these 
practices and institutions by building upon habits and institutions which have proved successful in their own sphere and which have in turn 
become the foundation of the civilization we have built up (Hayek 1945, pp 519-530). 
2 Mathematics is a study which, when we start from its most familiar portions, may be pursued in either of two opposite directions. The more 
familiar direction is constructive, towards gradually increasing complexity : from integers to fractions, real numbers, complex numbers ; 
from addition and multiplication to differentiation and integration, and on to higher mathematics. The other direction, which is less familiar, 
proceeds, by analysing, to greater and greater abstractness and logical simplicity ; instead of asking what can be defined and deduced from 
what is assumed to begin with, we ask instead what more general ideas and principles can be found, in terms of which what was our starting-
point can be defined or deduced (Russell 1919, pp1-2).  
3  A story is told of Pyrrho, the founder of Pyrrhonism (which was the old name for scepticism).  He maintained that we never know enough to 
be sure that one course of action is wiser than another.  In his youth, when he was taking his constitutional one afternoon, he saw his teacher 
in philosophy (from whom he had imbibed his principles) with his head stuck in a ditch, unable to get out.  After contemplating his for some 
time, he walked on, maintaining that there was no sufficient ground for thinking he would do any good by pulling the old man out.  Others, 
less sceptical, effected a rescue, and blamed Pyrrho for his heartlessness.  But his teacher, true to his principles, praised him for consistency 
(Russell 1928, pp 1-2). 
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(AICIS),1  and although On the Problem of Sustainable Economic Development: The Funk-Zweikampf Solution to this Prisoner’s 
Dilemma2 offers detailed methodological and contextual descriptions, it is chock-full of data cascades, passionate tricks of 
the advocate’s trade,3 and most desiderata would not warrant your attention, but the abstract offers a concentrated point 
of departure which will frame our solution, introduce key terms, begin to highlight implications, risks, and opportunities 
within my objective of offering you a working knowledge of my solution in less than a dozen pages: 
This paper offers a solution to The Problem of Sustainable Economic Development and a universal theory of value. We 
introduce axioms, and note they falsify the central thesis of ecological economics and solve a problem which has 
defied theorists since the time of Aristotle.4  We introduce our methods, the genesis and evolution of our theory, 
field notes from Mustique, Iceland, and Prince Edward Island, and set the stage for a more thorough discourse, 
of which this paper represents the first of three segments.  We demonstrate that value (V) is a derivative function 
of relative insularity (IR): V=f´(IR), then model economic development by dividing the world into geo-political 
islands5: P1: Relatively Insular States (RIS),6 and P2: Global Economic Military Superpowers (GEMS).7  Our axioms 
offer two dominant development strategies: S1: Maximum Economic Development, and S2: Maximum Ecological 
Preservation.  Furthermore, we discover pure GEMS (i.e. low IR) and pure RIS ( i.e. high IR) rational economic 
development strategies are antithetical, yet also discover these naturally opposing strategies represent the most 
tenable, rational solution-set possible: in light of inescapable human and planetary uncertainties, we discover the 
optimal RIS strategy = S2 and GEMS = S1.  We note our solution represents the Prisoner's Dilemma.  We also 
note, that, ceteris paribus, based upon revealed 20th and 21st century preferences, RIS strategy has been sub-
optimal/irrational (S1). GEMS strategy (S1), however, has been and remains rational and optimal.  Strategic 
Equilibrium/ESS8 is attained when players pursue respective rational, opposing development strategies.  
Equilibrium, however, offers windfalls: surplus value is created (RIS-driven ecological protection, and GEMS-
driven planetary protection).  In essence, this non-cooperative, strategic equilibrium paves the way for rational, 
mutually beneficial, cooperative behaviour, and yields higher ecological and planetary insularities, and thus 
                                                
1 AICIS... is an Åland based, international and independent, research institute which explores the economic and institutional aspects of insular 
entities - mainly from a comparative point of view. It operates, on a network basis, in close cooperation with other island institutes and 
academic institutions, as well as with a variety of economic and policy milieus, all over the world.  AICIS.... is an independent foundation, 
set up by a number of leading Ålandic companies: Åland Mutual, Alandia Corporations, Bank of Åland, and Åland Investment Ltd. [italics 
mine AICIS 2008]. 
2  See Funk 2008a. This complete discourse is published on the AICIS website: Naturally, I would gladly send an updated draft of this paper (v 
2.0, 1 July 2008) upon request. 
3  Explaining is a difficult art.  You can explain something so that your reader understands the words; and you can explain something so that the 
reader feels in in the marrow of his bones.  To do the latter, it sometimes it isn't enough to lay the evidence before the reader in a 
dispassionate way.  You have to become an advocate and use the tricks of the advocate's trade (Dawkins 1985, p xiv). 
4  As early as Aristotle we find an attempt to discover a measure of the use value of goods and to represent use value as the foundation of 
exchange value.  In the Ethica Nicomachea (v. 5. 1133a, 26–1133b, 10) he says that “there must be something that can be the measure of all goods 
[Italics mine, Menger 1871]. 
5  Our game theoretical approach rests upon a foundation insular evolutionary biology and set theory: our master island set includes all known 
planets capable of supporting human life.  To date this set includes a single element, the island of Earth: {I1}.  All bio-geo-politico regions on 
Earth are distinguishable by various degrees of relative insularity, and thus, all regions on Earth – islands, continents, and oceans alike – make 
up the sub-set:  {i1, i2, i3, ...in}.  In other words: {i1, i2, i3, ...in} ? {I1}. 
6  See ABBREVIATIONS & DEFINITIONS: Relatively Insular State 
7  See ABBREVIATIONS & DEFINITIONS: Global Economic Military Superpower 
8 See ABBREVIATIONS & DEFINITIONS: Strategic Equilibrium, & Evolutionary Stable Strategy 
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surplus economic and biologic value: RIS cooperate, form coalitions, and struggle for greater ecological insularity 
(ecological preservation); GEMS fight for economic development and planetary insularity (global defence, 
extraterrestrial exploration, and extra-planetary threat mitigation, such as the development of a SHIELD,1 
Gravity Tractor, or Asteroid Tugboat,2 and, ultimately, the means to inhabit another planet). Surplus value is 
maximized through strategic transparency:  If all players recognize the value of respective, opposing, and 
antithetical, rational strategies, then all players negotiate more rationally, efficiently, and peacefully.  We refer to 
our solution based upon two opposing, rational strategies as The Funk-Zweikampf Solution.  Moreover, we 
demonstrate our solution is as powerful at local and individual levels as it is at the national level, including its use 
as a tool for strategic decision-making under uncertainty and variable insularity.  Furthermore, our Theory of  
Value illuminates an entrenched, systemic, strategic RIS error which reflects the misguided application of 
economic principles and a fundamental constitutional flaw3 which promotes The Tragedy of the Commons.4  We 
consider the effects of relative insularity, the principles of rational pure RIS development strategy, and cite 
Åland, Iceland, and Japan as ideal island models for RIS/GEMS mixed-strategies.  Our theory also suggests that 
it is no coincidence that the island which best models optimal pure RIS economic development strategy (S2) is the 
extraordinarily independent, autonomous, privately-controlled island of Mustique.  We note this simplified 
model does not represent the only RIS mechanism for our solution, however, as all RIS and GEMS may optimize 
with this counter-intuitive solution.  Furthermore, our Theory of Value promotes self-organization, constitutional 
amendment, self-sufficiency, independence, and thus places stones along the illusive path to our tenable solution 
to The Problem of Sustainable Development. 5 
 
 Presently, I will only expand upon and demonstrate the relevance of one statement from this abstract.  Recall 
that I had asserted that  
Surplus value is maximized through strategic transparency:  If all players recognize the value of respective, 
opposing, and antithetical, rational strategies, then all players negotiate more rationally, efficiently, and 
peacefully. We refer to our solution based upon two opposing, rational strategies as The Funk-Zweikampf Solution.   
 
                                                
1  The greatest natural threat to the long-term survivability of mankind is an asteroid or comet impact with the Earth.  SHIELD is an 
architectural concept for a comprehensive Earth defense system designed to discover, catalog, calculate orbits of near-Earth Object, and to 
deflect potential impactors (Gold 2001, abstract). 
2  See ABBREVIATIONS & DEFINITIONS: Asteroid Tugboat & Gravity Tractor 
3 Is there a greater tragedy imaginable than that, in our endeavour consciously to shape our future in accordance with high ideals, we should in 
fact unwittingly produce the very opposite of what we have been striving? (Hayek 1944, p4). 
4 (a)  It should be clear by now that the idea of the commons did not suddenly arise out of nothing in the year 1968.  Passing references to the 
problem occur as far back as Aristotle, and Lloyd certainly saw it clearly in 1833. H. Scott Gordon's work in 1954 saw the beginning of a new 
concern with the problems presented by this politico-economic system. Yet the fact remains that a widespread recognition of these problems 
did not develop until after 1968. Why the delay? Two reasons are apparent.  First, a favorable climate of opinion was needed for remarks 
about the commons to be noticed.  This was created in the 1960's by the rapid growth of the environmental movement, which alerted people 
to the consequences of distributional systems. Second, it was necessary that the properties of the commons be stated in no uncertain terms if 
people were to consider the matter seriously. It was necessary that the human tragedy of adhering to a commons-type distribution be 
emphasized. A good, solid fortissimo minor chord had to be sounded. Before 1968 most of the sounds were either mere grace notes or 
extended passages played pianissimo. The down-playing was for good reason, of course: the clear message of the commons threatened 
cherished beliefs and practices. Abandoning any traditional practice requires a political upset (though revolution may be too strong a word) 
(Hardin 1977, p 1). 
(b)  I will also note that there was another important, insightful, pre-1968 work which clearly details this problem on the public lands of great 
American West: Stewart 1925.   Also see ABBREVIATIONS & DEFINITIONS:  Tragedy of the Commons 
5  Funk 2008a 
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Please allow me to offer an example.  On Monday, April 16, 2007, at 3:56 post-meridian, Reuters reported: 
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The Environmental Protection Agency said on Monday U.S. greenhouse gas 
emissions linked to global warming increased 16 percent over a 15-year period. 
     President George W. Bush pulled the United States out of the subsequent Kyoto global warming treaty, 
arguing the accord's limit on annual emissions would hurt the U.S. economy. 
 
Despite former vice-president Al Gore’s insistence that this statement is not true, I understand as well as you do 
that it is.  However, the passage I have highlighted above illustrates a powerful political tool offered by Funk-Zweikampf 
solution:  If an economic theory of value based upon relative insularity were well-understood, relatively insular states, 
including those low-lying island nations feeling most threatened by the effects of global warming, might be more inclined 
to understand if we were to say:  “We realize that the consequences of global warming are significant, but we must 
understand that they merely represents one of more than a dozen even more threatening global risks, and our ability to offer 
all inhabitants of the earth protection from this myriad of global risks depends largely upon an unhindered U.S. 
economy.  And if members of these relatively insular states wish to pursue dominant, rational, selfish economic 
development strategies, we will likewise understand their reluctance to engage with in the trade when they state “We 
realize that your economy functions more effectively when all nations, including ours, engage in unrestricted, free-trade 
with the United States.  This, however, does not represent a good, long-term value proposition for us, and you will in 
fact, in the long term, appreciate our objectives of independence, self-sufficiency, and the maximum preservation of our 
ecology.  With this illustrative point and the abstract in mind, let’s move directly to our solution: the Seven Axioms1 
map (1) the lower limit of what must be known,2 (2) the upper limit of what may be known, and thus (3), as Nash noted,3  
                                                
1 These Axioms rest upon (1) the fundamental physical laws of science, and (2) the syllogistic core of natural selection: (i) Fluid Mechanics 
(Archimedes’ Principle), (ii) Force, Mass, and Inertia (Kepler’s Three Laws of Planetary Motion, Newton’s Three Laws of Motion, Newton’s 
Law of Universal Gravitation), (iii) Heat, Energy, and Temperature (Newton’s Law of Cooling, Boyle’s Law, Law of Conservation of Energy, 
Joule’s First and Second Law,  The Four Laws of Thermodynamics), (iv) Quantum Mechanics (Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle), and (v) 
Superfecundity, Variation, Heredity, and Natural Selection (Darwin’s Laws of Natural Selection).  
2  Before we can try to remold society intelligently, we must understand its functioning; we must realize that, even when we believe that we 
understand it, we may be mistaken. What we must learn to understand is that human civilization has a life of its own, that all our efforts to 
improve things must operate within a working whole which we cannot entirely control, and the operation of whose forces we can hope 
merely to facilitate and assist so far as we can understand them (Hayek 1960, pp 69-70). 
3 One states as axioms several properties that it would seem natural for the solution to have and then one discovers that the axioms actually 
determine the solution uniquely.  The two approaches to the problem, via the negotiation model or via the axioms, are complementary; each 
helps to justify and clarify the other (Nash 1953, p 129). 
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helps determine and clarify our unique solution: 
AXIOM I  The Ground Zero Premise1 
The Problem of the Struggle for Life 
(i) Survival and reproduction is the basic, continuing, inescapable problem for all living organisms; life is 
at bottom a survival enterprise. It follows that survival is the... “problem” for human societies as well; it 
is a prerequisite for any other, more exalted objectives. Although the term “adaptation” is also familiar 
to social scientists, until recently it has been used only selectively, and often very imprecisely....Our 
economic and social life (and the motivations behind our revealed preferences and subjective utility 
assessments), not to mention the actions of modern governments... [is] either directly or indirectly 
related to the meeting of our basic survival needs.2 
AXIOM II  The R-3 Premise3 
The Problem of the Limited Resources 
Global natural Resource consumption is approximately three times (3x) the earthly replenishing rate.  
Though this problem may be soluble on local, municipal, regional, and even on national levels, in light 
of The Tragedy of the Commons, it is insoluble at the global level. 
AXIOM III   The Ecological Uncertainty Premise   
Axiom II poses a threat to Axiom I.   
AXIOM IV   The Political Uncertainty Premise 
   The Problem of  Warfighting:4 
(i) (1) the system is anarchic, (2) all great powers have some offensive military capability, (3) states can 
never be certain about other states’ intentions, (4) states seek to survive, and (5) great powers 
are rational actors or strategic calculators.5 
(ii) Extinction follows chiefly from the competition of tribe with tribe, and race with race.  Various 
checks are always in action, ...which serve to keep down the numbers of each... tribe, such as... 
famines,... wars, accidents, sickness,... infanticide, and, perhaps, lessened fertility from less nutritious 
food, and many hardships.  If from any cause any one of these checks is lessened, even in a slight degree, 
the tribe thus favoured will tend to increase; and when one of two adjoining tribes becomes more 
numerous and powerful than the other, the contest is soon settled by war.6 
A nuclear exchange involving full superpower arsenals, including resultant nuclear winter…, could 
result in 2 bn person deaths (30% of world population). Pro rata, this is equivalent to an all-biota loss of 
547 bn tonnes biomass. The cumulative risk during 40 years of Cold War of this occurring was seen by 
some as much as 50 per cent.  In the next century, a realignment leading to a new standoff as dangerous 
as the Cold  War cannot be ruled out.7 
                                                
1  Also see annotation 1under Popper 1992; also see TOUCHSTONE; also see Dawkins 1985,  
2 Corning 2000, abstract.  
3 Resource Replenishing Rate. 
4  In one of the greatest speeches of all time – his second inaugural – Abraham Lincoln said: “Both parties deprecated war; but one would make 
war rather than let the nation survive; and the other would accept war rather than let it perish.  And the war came.” It is a big mistake to say 
that war is irrational.  We take all the ills of the world – wars, strikes, racial discrimination – and dismiss them by calling them irrational.  
They are not necessarily irrational.  Though it hurts, they may be rational.  If war is rational, once we understand that it is, we can at least somehow 
address the problem. If we simply dismiss it as irrational, we can’t address the problem (Italics mine, Aumann 2005, p 351). 
5 Bold and underlined emphasis mine, Mearsheimer, p 112, 2006c. 
6 Darwin 1888, p 912. 
7  Leggett 2006.  
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AXIOM V The Planetary Uncertainty Premise  
The Problem of Semi-closed Planetary Systems (such as the Earth) 
(i) The range of potential types of global risk, as well as their apparent imminence, is significantly 
increasing. Illustrating this increase, Rees [1] concluded starkly that, if we do nothing, humanity has a 50 
per cent chance of becoming extinct within the next century. 
(ii) In light of Axiom I, even if we are able to mitigate Axiom IV, and even if we are able so survive the 
next century, given the gravity of the critical problems outlined in this Axiom, an alternative inhabitable 
planet must be discovered, and immigration must occur within an unknown and unknowable time-
frame, ostensibly as soon as tomorrow, but no later 50,000 years from present.1 Although I will not 
delve into details for many risk factors below, Mark Leggett's An Indicative Costed Plan for the Mitigation of 
Global Risks details and ranks his assessment of the 15 risk factors most likely to bring about human 
extinction; although some details are offered to illustrate the relative magnitude, for brevity’s sake (and 
a minor difference of opinion on a few minor points), not all are detailed nor even listed (though I have 
added a few), but please read with the assumption that any and all known significant risks are 
theoretically included: this axiom’s purpose is not to provide an exhaustive list of risk factors, but to 
illustrate the nature of the dilemma The Problem of Sustainable Economic Development inherently presents.  
However, it is of interest and relevant to this letter to note that Leggett ranks The Problem of Global  
Warming 8th out of 15.  Risks are roughly listed in order of importance:  
(1) The Problem of Scientific Experiments Altering the Fabric of the Universe and/or the Ecology of Earth2  
(2) The Problem of Meteorites: 
(a) The Earth has a long and violent history of collisions with extraterrestrial bodies such as asteroids and 
comet nuclei. Several of these impacts have been large enough to produce major environmental changes, 
causing mass extinctions and severe alterations to weather patterns and geography. There is no reason to 
suppose that the likelihood of such collisions will be any less in the future and the spread of human 
settlement, civilisation, and particularly urbanisation, makes it much more likely that a future impact, 
even relatively small, could result in the massive loss of human life and property. Despite the fact that 
the technology exists to predict and to some extent prevent such events, there is currently no co-
                                                
1  Stephen Hawking called for a massive investment in establishing colonies on the Moon and Mars in a lecture in honour of NASA's 50th 
anniversary. He argued that the world should devote about 10 times as much as NASA's current budget – or 0.25% of the world's financial 
resources – to space. 
           The renowned University of Cambridge physicist has previously spoken in favour of colonising space as an insurance policy against the 
possibility of humanity being wiped out by catastrophes... He argues that humanity should eventually expand to other solar systems…. 
           "Robotic missions are much cheaper and may provide more scientific information, but they don't catch the public imagination in the same 
way, and they don't spread the human race into space, which I'm arguing should be our long-term strategy," Hawking said. "If the human 
race is to continue for another million years, we will have to boldly go where no one has gone before." 
           "We cannot envision visiting them with current technology, but we should make interstellar travel a long-term aim," he said. "By long 
term, I mean over the next 200 to 500 years…." 
           "Even if we were to increase the international [space exploration] budget 20 times to make a serious effort to go into space, it would only 
be a small fraction of world GDP," he said. GDP, or Gross Domestic Product, is a measure of a country's economic activity. 
           Hawking argued that the world can afford 0.25% of its collective GDP to devote to space colonisation. "Isn't our future worth a quarter of 
a percent?" he asked. 
           The physicist also speculated on the reasons that SETI (Search for Extra-Terrestrial Intelligence) projects have not yet detected any alien 
civilisations. 
           He offered three possibilities: that life of any kind is very rare in the universe; that simple life forms are common, but intelligent life rare; 
or that intelligent life tends to quickly destroy itself. 
           "Personally, I favour the second possibility – that primitive life is relatively common, but that intelligent life is very rare," he said.    
     "Some would say it has yet to occur on Earth" (Hawkins & Shiga 2008). 
2  See Greenleaf & Kremen 2006 ; Leggett 2006. 
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ordinated international response to this threat.1 
(b) It is widely believed that meteorites originate in the asteroid belt, but the precise dynamical 
mechanism whereby material is transported to Earth has eluded discovery.  The observational data for 
the ordinary chondrites, the most common meteorites, impose severe constraints on any proposed 
mechanism.  The ordinary chondrites are not strongly shocked, their cosmic ray exposure ages are 
typically <20 Myr, their radiants are concentrated near the antapex of Earth's motion and they show a 
pronounced 'afternoon excess' (for every meteorite which falls in the morning two fall in the afternoon).  
Wetherill concluded that these data could only be explained by an "unobserved source" of material...  
His subsequent, more sophisticated investigations have not changed this basic conclusion.  Recently I 
have shown that there is a large chaotic zone in the phase space near the 3/1 mean motion 
commensurability with Jupiter and that the chaotic trajectories within this zone have particularly large 
variations in orbital eccentricity. Since asteroidal debris is quite easily injected into this chaotic zone, it 
could provide Wetherill's 'unobserved source' if chaotic trajectories which begin at asteroidal 
eccentricities (e<0.2) reach such large eccentricities that Earth's orbit is crossed (e>0.57)... At least 
some of these chaotic trajectories do have the properties required to transport meteoritic material from 
the asteroid belt to Earth. Combined with the Monte Carlo calculations which show that the resulting 
meteorites are consistent with all the observational constraints, the case for this chaotic route to Earth is 
fairly strong [italics mine].2 
(3)  The Problem of Biovorous Nanoreplicators 
(4)  The Problem of Supermassive Star Collapse  
(5) The Problem of Super-Eruptions: 
(a) In the past 2 Myr, there have been, on average, two super-eruptions every hundred millennia, the 
last of which shattered the crust of New Zealand's north island 26,500 years ago.  To date, no 
mechanisms have been discovered for predicting these events; thus an eruption of this magnitude (VE8)3 
is possible within this decade and likely within 50,000 years. Post-eruption human survival is unlikely; 
even smaller eruptions (VE4, VE5, VE6) present extraordinary challenges. 
(b) The Laki eruption, and other similar large lava eruptions in Iceland (e.g., Eldgja, AD 934…) and the 
Canary Islands (Lanzarote, AD 1731…), was accompanied by widespread dry fogs… and unusual 
climatic cooling in the northern hemisphere… Using the ice core record, it can be seen that large 
Icelandic fissure basalt eruptions (≥10 km3) occur perhaps about once per millennium (e.g., AD934 and 
AD1783)... Estimates of H2SO4 aerosols produced by Laki range from 77–190 Mt based on erupted 
volume of magma, to 100–280 Mt based on acid fallout over Greenland (Stothers 1996). From estimates 
of atmospheric opacity in the dry fog of 1783 over Europe, Stothers (1996) suggested an aerosol mass of 
∼150 Mt. The resulting “haze famine” in Iceland, related to crop failures and livestock death from 
volcanic pollution (from SO2, F, Cl, etc.), led to the death of 25% of the Icelandic population. The AD 
934 Eldgja eruption may have had a similar serious effect on early Icelandic colonization (Stothers 1998). 
Historic eruptions were quite small, however, compared to some volcanic events in the geologic record 
of the past million years that may truly be called “supereruptions.” The largest recorded explosive 
eruptions (VEI =8 and ≥1012 m3 of bulk deposits) were large caldera-forming eruptions that produced 
large-volume pyroclastic flow deposits (ignimbrites) and widespread ashfall... Some of the largest events 
occurred in continental hotspot areas where extensional tectonics and thick continental crust lead to 
large-volume magma chambers of silicic composition…  The greatest explosive eruption in the past few 
hundred thousand years was the Toba (Sumatra) event of ∼73,500 years ago…  This event produced at 
                                                
1 Tate 2006, abstract. 
2 Wisdom 1985, abstract. 
3 Self 1982 
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least 2,800 km3 of magma (pyroclastic flow deposits, pumice fall, and ash) and is estimated to have 
created from 1,000 to 10,000 Mt of stratospheric dust and sulfuric acid aerosols... Extrapolation of the 
data of Pyle et al. (1996) to VEI 8 eruptions gives about 1000 Mt of SO2 release, which would be 
converted to aerosols in the stratosphere. The Toba aerosols apparently persisted for up to 6 years in the 
upper atmosphere...  Based on scaling up from smaller eruptions and computer models, stratospheric 
aerosol loading of ∼1000 Mt is predicted to have caused a “volcanic winter,” with a global cooling of 
3to5◦C for several years, and regional coolings up to 15◦C...  Such a cooling is estimated to have 
drastically affected tropical and temperate vegetation and ecosystems...  All above-ground tropical 
vegetation would have been killed by sudden hard freezes, and a 50% die-off of temperate forests is 
predicted from hard freezes during the growing season... This probable climatic and ecologic disaster 
may have impacted humans.  Evidence from human genetic studies have been interpreted as indicating a 
severe human population bottleneck—a near extinction—with reductions to a total population as small 
as a few thousand at a time just prior to ∼60,000 years ago...  This is roughly the same interval as the 
great Toba eruption, and a cause and effect relationship with Toba has been proposed… and is supported 
by the predicted severe ecological effects of the eruption. 
(6) The Problem of Global  Warming 
(7) The Problem of Ice Ages (both natural and anthropogenic) 
(8) The Problem of Chaotic Behaviour: 
There are several physical situations in the solar system where chaotic behavior plays an important role. 
Saturn's satellite Hyperion is currently tumbling chaotically. Many of the other irregularly shaped 
satellites in the solar system had chaotic rotations in the past. There are also examples of chaotic orbital 
evolution.  Meteorites are most probably transported to Earth from the asteroid belt by way of a chaotic 
zone. Chaotic behavior also seems to be an essential ingredient in the explanation of certain non-
uniformities in the distribution of asteroids.  The long-term motion of Pluto is suspiciously complicated.1 
(9) The Problem of Solar Flux: 
There has been life on Earth for at least 3,500 Myr but the assumption that a comparable future lies 
ahead may not be justified. Main sequence stars appear to increase their burning rate as they age.  Thus 
the Sun, if a typical star, can be predicted to have increased its output by 30% since the Earth's origin 
4,500 Myr ago. The maintenance of an equable climate since life began probably required some means of 
planetary thermo-stasis.  The Gaia hypothesis proposed by Lovelock and Margulis included an 
unspecified biological means for climate control. Walker... suggests an abiological automatic 
thermostasis in which the atmospheric abundance of CO2, a greenhouse gas, adjusts to resist the 
warming tendency of the increased solar flux. It is clear that whatever the mechanism, atmospheric CO2 
is now close to its lower limit of partial pressure, so the biosphere may soon, in geological terms, be 
exposed without protection to the predicted progressive increase of solar luminosity.2 
(10)  The Problem of Ohmic Decay: 
The mechanism by which the Earth and other planets maintain their magnetic fields against ohmic decay 
is among the longest standing problems in planetary science.  Although it is widely acknowledged that 
these fields are maintained by dynamo action, the mechanism by which the dynamo operates is in large 
part not understood.  Numerical simulations of the dynamo process in the Earth's core have produced 
magnetic fields that resemble the Earth's field, but it is unclear whether these models accurately 
represent the extremely low values of viscosity believed to be appropriate to the core.3 
 
                                                
1 Wisdom 1987, abstract. 
2 All italics mine, Lovelock & Whitfield 1982, abstract. 
3 Kuang & Bloxham 1997, abstract. 
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AXIOM VI The Deductive Premise 
 The Problem of Induction1 
This may represent the most deeply entrenched, least understood (and/or acknowledged),2 relatively 
simple problem on Earth, and thus perhaps the crux of his axiomatic solution.  Therefore, we offer a 
clarification within the following Axiom and within the closing remarks which follow our axiomatic 
derivation of our solution.  For now, however, consider the following propositoin:  Will the sun rise 
tomorrow?  Those whom have mistakenly adopted inductive methods would conclude that, based upon 
5,292.5 billion affirmative inferences (365 days X 14.5 Byr), yes, we may conclude with certainty (and 
validity) that the sun will rise tomorrow.  However, as we have just demonstrated in both axioms IV and 
V, there are many black swans which would falsify our inductive logic.  As Professor Popper noted, no 
matter how many instances of white swans we may have observed, this does not justify the conclusion that all swans 
are white. 
 
AXIOM VII The Insularity Premise 
  The Problem of  Value 
 The search for an economic theory of value may have begun with Aristotle.  For the next half-century, 
however, very little progress was made, and the evolutionary stable strategy tabled in 1776 by Smith3 
was fully adopted by the classical school and generally accepted for nearly a century.  The German 
school grew critical, however, and this Germanic scepticism gave birth to the Austrian School and their 
quest for a new Theory of Value, which  began with a very independent professor of political economy at 
the University of Vienna, the Austrian School's founding father, Carl Menger (1840–1921).  In his 1871 
Grundsätze der  Volkswirtschaftslehre (Principles of Economics), Menger outlines his groundbreaking theory.4   
      Perhaps the most convoluted, self-refuting theory may have been tabled by Walras in 1886.5  Walras, 
however, was certainly not alone in his approach.  Indeed, all known (to this fairly well-read author, that 
is) attempted solutions since Menger have, essentially, followed Wieser's method,6 and, despite the 
extraordinary efforts from Aristotle to Smith to Menger to Weiser, economics has remained without a 
theory of value.  Note, however, the development of our theory has not followed the methodological 
approach consistent with previous attempts.  Based upon our understanding that insularity is the key to 
                                                
1 See ABBREVIATIONS & DEFINITIONS:  The Problem of Induction. 
2  It took a remarkably long time before the novelty of the intellectual situation was grasped. Few realized what had happened. David 
Hume…saw that a great step forward had been taken, but he did not understand just how great and how radical this advance in human 
knowledge really was. I am afraid that even today many people still do not fully understand this [Italics mine, Popper 1994, p 36]. 
3 (a) Gould 2002. 
 (b) It has been said that one finds in Adam Smith nearly all the explanations of value which have ever been attempted.  What is certain is that, 
in his explanation, Adam Smith has put together two views that contradict each other (Wieser 1893, p xxvii). 
4 (a) It is in Austria, in the lineal succession to Menger, that the development of the new value theory is to be sought (Wieser 1893, p xxxiv). 
 (b) In Chapter III, Menger (1871) presents his groundbreaking Theory of Value; the essence, clarity, and promethean insight of this chapter 
may best sampled in Section E:  The value of the services of land, capital, and labour, in particular. 
5 That of Walras, though admirable of its kind, suffers, to my mind, from the preponderance of the mathematical element.  The laws which 
govern amounts of the value undoubtedly allow of a mathematical expression ; nay, the more complicated of these can be expressed exactly 
only by means of mathematics ; and here certainly mathematics has a great task to fulfil.  But in the value theory we have to do with 
something more than the expression of the laws of amounts.  The obscure conception of value is to be made clear ; all its manifold forms are to 
be described [italics mine] ; the service of value in economic life is to be analysed ; the connection of value with so many other economic 
phenomena is to be shown (Wieser 1893, p xxxiii). 
6 The economist who undertakes to explain value has to explain the procedure of those who value.  He describes in plain language the meaning 
of transactions carried on, times without number, by all of us.  He does, on a large scale and with a difficult subject, the same thing as one 
who accurately describes some trade or some mechanical operation, which every one can do, but which it is not easy, without the assistance 
of concrete instances, to present and follow up in all its complexity of conditions (1893, p 5). 
17 of 66 
evolutionary fitness (including, for example, economic evolutionary fitness) and thus life on earth,1 our 
theory of value is constructed by demonstrating that value (V) is a derivative function of relative insularity; 
we are able to quantify value far more accurately and far more easily by quantifying it indirectly.2  Aside 
from the originality of value based upon insular qualities, the derivative nature of this theory is what lends 
this insight elegance, simplicity, and power:  V=f´(IR)!  The utter simplicity and descriptive power of 
this theory, what sets it apart from every known previous attempt, is this is the first which expressly 
does not attempt to “describe all manifold forms,” and “the myriad connections of economic 
phenomena;” rather, this theory describes the environment3 in which economic value is created (from 
which it is derived)!  In other words, the relative insularity of a biogeographic region itself is not what 
makes it valuable, the value is derived as a direct by-product of this insularity.  For example, backing out 
to the most macro-view, a quick look at the relative insularity of the Earth reveals that the earth is more 
valuable, relatively speaking, than the other planets in our solar system due to the value of the relatively 
high level of atmospheric insularity which enables the Earth to produce both biologic and economic 
value:  Life!     
    Moreover, although our quest had commenced as a search for an economic theory of value, in the end, 
our solution   produced a universal (economic and biologic) Theory of Value, which presents a solution to 
what arguably represents the most fundamental problem in any so-called “field” of science, since relative 
insularity is as valuable to whales, dragonflies, and unicellular organisms as it is to man.  Although this 
solution was inadvertent, it is a logical outcome, since it is well understood that a useful, truthful 
economic theory of value requires a biogeographical and political foundation which acknowledged The 
Problem of Induction, including both political and extraterrestrial uncertainties.  Our theory was 
constructed by simply observing nauture, by simply observing the universal revealed preference for 
relative insularity, and thus, moreover, discovering that value (V) is a derivative function of relative 
insularity (IR): V=f´(IR).  Our axioms also reveal that, contrary to the central thesis of so-called 
“ecological economics,” the Earth is not in fact a closed-system, but rather merely semi-closed and thus 
only relatively insular.  Comprehending these biological and panetary realities is the cornerstone to the 
comprehension of our unified theory.  Greater clarity may be derived with the following game 
theoretical application:  Applying our Theory of Value within requisite biogeographical & political contex 
of the necessirily non-coopertive game (in which all the world is a stage; note the great Nash insight 
pasted across the cover-page) reveals divergent, optimizing rational strategies for continental (GEMS) and 
insular (RIS) economic development.  Our theory reveals pure GEMS and RIS strategies are antithetical, 
yet discover, in light of The Problem of Induction, these naturally opposing strategies represent the most 
tenable, rational solution possible.  How is it possible that two players may arrive at two different, 
antithetical optimal strategies when utilizing the same theory of value?  Although there is ultimately only 
one sphere of insularity, it must be defended on two inherently uncertain levels: (1) insularity pertaining 
to the biosphere (i.e. Ecology: Axioms I-III, the “whole world” according to the principles of “ecological 
                                                
1 Carlquist 1974, p 1. 
2 IR is formulated with: Land Area (km2), Elevation (m), Distance from nearest Continent (km), Distance from nearest Neighbour (km), Nearest Neighbour 
Land Area (km2), Renewable Water Resources (m3/person/year), Population Density (p/km2), Exclusive Economic Zone Area (km2), International Airports (n), 
Deep Water Harbours (n), Marine Links, (n) Land Links (n), Forests (% km2), Commercial Agriculture (% km2), Organic Agriculture (% km2), Subsistence 
Agriculture (% km2), Nature Preserve (%k m2), Tourist Visits (p/yr), Irrigation (m3/person/year & % km2), Industrial Water Consumption 
(m3/person/year), Organic Water Pollutants (grammes/p/day), Food Imports (%), Sovereign Status, Constitutional Balance, Cultural Homogeneity, and 
Military Power.  We calibrate our formulae by adjusting relative input weighting in accordance a positive, linear biogeographical correlation 
between IR and the average human life expectancy for the corresponding politico-biogeographic area. 
3 One of the great discoveries of game theory came in the early seventies, when the biologists John Maynard Smith and George Price realized 
that strategic equilibrium in games and population equilibrium in the living world are defined by the same equations. Evolution be it genetic 
or memetic – leads to strategic equilibrium (Aumann 2005, p 352). 
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economics”), and (2) insularity pertaining to the semi-closed nature of the biosphere, including planetary 
and extra-planetary forces and uncertainties (i.e. meteorites, volcanoes, chaotic gravitational forces, 
supernovas, etc.: Axiom V), and geopolitical uncertainty (i.e. War: Axiom IV).  Generally speaking, 
pure RIS strategy protects relative insularity on the first level, while GEMS pure strategy protects 
relative insularity on the second level.  Moreover, our theory of value is as applicable and powerful at 
the local and individual levels as it is at the national/global level, including its use as a powerful analytical 
tool applicable to common problems, such as: (1) where to live (addressing both biogeographical and 
geopolitical insularity), (2) what to eat, (3) how to vote, (4) where to vacation, (5) what type of vehicle 
to drive, (6) what types of investments to make, (7) what water to drink, and, most generally, (8) 
understanding how relative insularity frames strategic decision-making under uncertainty. 
 
I realize this concentrated outline is perhaps yet rather abstract, but I trust the implications and the 
utility may be immediately recognizably; if they are not as readily clear as I hope they may be, I detailed some of 
the most significant implications in a recent, necessarily1 pointed letter which I believe the first few pages may 
offer clarification: 
Sir Partha Dasgupta, Fellow, St. John's College           1 May 2008  
University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics 
Sidgwick Avenue 
Cambridge, England     
 
RE:  A Solution to The Problem of Sustainable Economic Development 
 
Dear Sir: 
     I am writing to inform you that you have made a great mistake.   
     Your error came to my attention while reviewing Nature in Economics.2  I emphasize the greatness of 
this mistake because, upon a broad review of your considerable works,3 I have discovered that this 
fundamental error is entrenched in your most fundamental assumptions, and in short, I conjecture you 
have committed this error for four (possibly five) primary reasons :  (1) you do not understand The 
Problem of Induction, (2) you do not understand that economics is a derivative science (and derivative, in this 
                                                
1  What Mises taught us in his writings, in his lectures, in his seminars, and in perhaps everything he said, was that economics—yes, and I 
mean sound economics, Austrian economics—is primordially, crucially important. Economics is not an intellectual game. Economics is 
deadly serious. The very future of mankind—of civilization—depends, in Mises’ view, upon widespread understanding of, and respect for, 
the principles of economics.  
     This is a lesson, which is located almost entirely outside economics proper. But all Mises’ work depended ultimately upon this tenet. 
Almost invariably, a scientist is motivated by values not strictly part of the science itself. The lust for fame, for material rewards—even the 
pure love of truth—these goals may possibly be fulfilled by scientific success, but are themselves not identified by science as worthwhile 
goals. What drove Mises, what accounted for his passionate dedication, his ability calmly to ignore the sneers of, and the isolation imposed 
by, academic contemporaries, was his conviction that the survival of mankind depends on the development and dissemination of Austrian 
economics.  
     Austrian economics is not simply a matter of intellectual problem solving, like a challenging crossword puzzle, but literally a matter of 
the life or death of the human race (Kirzner 2006). 
2 2007. 
3 See SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY: Dasgupta. 
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sense, is not a reference to the well-known financial  WMD's,1 but rather to Bertrand Russell's Theory of 
Economic Power),2 and moreover (3) you have failed to comprehend, essentially, the whole economy of 
nature;3 (4) you do not understand that subject matters do not exist,4 and (5) another possible reason, I 
suspect, may be related to your personal religious beliefs, but since I do not know you personally, I will 
leave this point for your consideration…5 
                                                
1 The derivatives genie is now well out of the bottle, and these instruments will almost certainly multiply in variety and number until some 
event makes their toxicity clear. Knowledge of how dangerous they are has already permeated the electricity and gas businesses, in which the 
eruption of major troubles caused the use of derivatives to diminish dramatically. Elsewhere, however, the derivatives business continues to 
expand unchecked. Central banks and governments have so far found no effective way to control, or even monitor, the risks posed by these 
contracts. 
      Charlie and I believe Berkshire should be a fortress of financial strength – for the sake of our owners, creditors, policyholders and 
employees. We try to be alert to any sort of megacatastrophe risk, and that posture may make us unduly apprehensive about the burgeoning 
quantities of long-term derivatives contracts and the massive amount of uncollateralized receivables that are growing alongside. In our view, 
however, derivatives are financial weapons of mass destruction, carrying dangers that, while now latent, are potentially lethal [Buffett 2003, 
p 15.  Also see Jon Danielsson's (2000) The Emperor has no Clothes: Limits to Risk modeling].  
2 (a) Economic power, unlike military power, is not primary, but derivative.  Within one State, it depends on law; in international dealings it is only on 
minor issues that it depends on law, but when large issues are involved it depends upon war or the threat of war.  It has been customary to accept 
economic power without analysis, and this has led, in modern times, to an undue emphasis upon economics, as opposed to war and 
propaganda, in the causal interpretation of history.   
      Apart from the economic power of labour, all other economic power, in its ultimate analysis, consists in being able to decide, by the use of armed force if 
necessary, who shall be allowed to stand upon a given piece of land and to put things into it and take things from it [all italics mine, 1928, p 95].  
 (b) The very nature of economics is rooted in nationalism....It would never have been developed except in the hope of throwing light upon questions of policy, 
but policy means nothing unless there is authority to carry it out, and authorities are national [italics mine Robinson 1962, p 117].  
 (c) Power Projection:  The ability of a nation to apply all or some of its elements of national power - political, economic, informational, or 
military - to rapidly and effectively deploy and sustain forces in and from multiple dispersed locations to respond to crises, to contribute to 
deterrence, and to enhance regional stability (The United States Department of Defense 2001). 
3 See ABBREVIATIONS & DEFINITIONS:  The Struggle for Life. 
4 As a rule, I begin my lectures on Scientific Method by telling my students that scientific method does not exist. I add that I ought to know, 
having been, for a time at least, the one and only professor of this non-existent subject within the British Commonwealth.  
     It is in several senses that my subject does not exist, and I shall mention a few of them. 
      First, my subject does not exist because subject matters in general do not exist. There are no subject matters; no branches of learning—or, 
rather, of inquiry: there are only problems, and the urge to solve them. A science such as botany or chemistry (or say, physical chemistry, or 
electrochemistry) is, I contend, merely an administrative unit. University administrators have a difficult job anyway, and it is a great 
convenience to them to work on the assumption that there are some named subjects, with chairs attached to them to be filled by the experts 
in these subjects. I do not agree: even serious students are misled by the myth of the subject. And I should be reluctant to call anything that 
misleads a person a convenience to that person. 
      So much about the non-existence of subjects in general. But Scientific Method holds a somewhat peculiar position in being even less 
existent than some other non-existent subjects. 
      What I mean is this. The founders of the subject, Plato, Aristotle, Bacon and Descartes, as well as most of their successors, for example 
John Stuart Mill, believed that there existed a method of finding scientific truth. In a later and slightly more sceptical period there were 
methodologists who believed that there existed a method, if not of finding a true theory, then at least of ascertaining whether or not some 
given hypothesis was true; or (even more sceptical) whether some given hypothesis was at least 'probable' to some ascertainable degree. 
      I assert that no scientific method exists in any of these three senses. To put it in a more direct way: 
  (1) There is no method of discovering a scientific theory. 
  (2) There is no method of ascertaining the truth of a scientific hypothesis, i.e., no method of verification. 
  (3) There is no method of ascertaining whether a hypothesis is 'probable', or probably true [Popper 1956, pp 5-6].    
5 (a) The word God is for me nothing more than the expression and product of human weaknesses, the Bible a collection of honourable, but 
still primitive legends which are nevertheless pretty childish.  No interpretation no matter how subtle can (for me) change this.  These 
subtilised interpretations are highly manifold according to their nature and have almost nothing to do with the original text. For me the 
Jewish religion like all other religions is an incarnation of the most childish superstitions. And the Jewish people to whom I gladly belong and 
with whose mentality I have a deep affinity have no different quality for me than all other people. As far as my experience goes, they are also 
no better than other human groups, although they are protected from the worst cancers by a lack of power. Otherwise I cannot see anything 
'chosen' about them. 
      In general I find it painful that you claim a privileged position and try to defend it by two walls of pride, an external one as a man and an 
20 of 66 
     I have not written this letter to be cruel; it is not my intent to ridicule you. In fact, as I have stated, I do 
suspect you may be a great man.  But, following in the footsteps of Popper, Russell, Pyrrho,1 and Socrates, I 
have accepted an obligation to stand my post, remain ever on the lookout, and never hesitate to table criticism.  
Indeed, our survival may depend upon it.2 
     Did you notice the brief outline of my “UNIFIED THEORY OF THE BIOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL 
SCIENCES & SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT” I clipped 
to the top of this letter?  If you considered the axioms carefully, perhaps your great mistake has already occurred 
to you.  I did endeavour, afterall, to make this lesson as simple as possible for you to understand.  If it hasn't 
occurred to you yet, note that your assumptions, the framework upon which all of your works have been based 
for at least the past two decades, are contained within axioms I through III.  Although I am not a gambling man, I 
believe you will discover your mistakes may be directly related to the fact that you have failed to comprehend 
inherent uncertainties associated with axioms IV through VII (of which, more to follow).  I've noted errors are 
nothing to be ashamed of;  this error is especially free of disgrace, since all of your fellow practitioners of your 
so-called “ecological economics” (as well as many other economists, naturally) have committed, and continue to 
commit the exact same error.  Yes, I believe you will discover that this discourse is not simply a refutation of 
your Nature in Economics, but ultimately a falsification of the theoretical framework and central thesis of 
“ecological economics”….  
     Over the past forty years… many of those most able to navigate the perilous seas3 of economics, mistakenly 
assert that neoclassical economic theory fails to pass the test of the second law of thermodynamics,4 then proceed 
                                                                                                                                                                          
internal one as a Jew. As a man you claim, so to speak, a dispensation from causality otherwise accepted, as a Jew the privilege of 
monotheism. But a limited causality is no longer a causality at all, as our wonderful Spinoza recognized with all incision, probably as the first 
one. And the animistic interpretations of the religions of nature are in principle not annulled by monopolisation. With such walls we can only 
attain a certain self-deception, but our moral efforts are not furthered by them. On the contrary (Einstein 1954). 
 (b) I am aware that the assumed instinctive belief in God has been used by many persons as an argument for His existence. But this is a rash 
argument, as we should thus be compelled to believe in the existence of many cruel and malignant spirits, only a little more powerful than 
man; for the belief in them is far more general than in a beneficent Deity. The idea of a universal and beneficent Creator does not seem to 
arise in the mind of man, until he has been elevated by long-continued culture (Darwin 1883, p 1242). 
 (c) Beware of the man whose god is in the skies (Shaw 1903, ln 83).   
 (d) Also see Hitchens 2007 ; Weale 2007 ; Dawkins 2006 ; Darwin 1883 ; Russell 1931 ; Hume 1777a, 1777b, & 1779. 
1 Sceptic:  A seeker of truth.  One who, like Pyrrho and his followers in Greek antiquity… holds that there are no adequate grounds for 
certainty as to the truth of any proposition…  Those who deny the competence of reason, or the existence of a justification for certitude, 
outside the limits of experience.  The difference between the two usages becomes clearer when considering ‘sceptic’s’ Latin origin 
(scepticus):  inquiring, reflective, assumed by the disciples of Phyrrho as their distinctive epithet… to look out (OED 1997).  
2 If our civilization is to survive, we must break with the habit of deference to great men.  Great men may make great mistakes...  Their 
influence, too rarely challenged, continues to mislead those on whose defense civilization depends, and to divide them. The responsibility for 
this tragic and possibly fatal division becomes ours if we hesitate to be outspoken in our criticism of what admittedly is a part of our 
intellectual heritage. By our reluctance to criticize some of it, we may help to destroy all of it (Popper 1945, inscription). 
3 There are ‘perilous seas’ in the world of thought, which can only be sailed by those who are willing to face their own physical powerlessness.  
And above all, there is liberation from the tyranny of Fear, which blots out the light of day and keeps men grovelling and cruel.  No man is 
liberated from fear who dare not see his place in the world as it is; no man can achieve the greatness of which he is capable until he has 
allowed himself to see his own littleness (Russell 1928, pp 22). 
4 Economic theory has always maintained that economic value is “generated” solely within the economy where it is fully distributed among the 
factors of production before being “consumed”. According to this theory, the economy is an isolated system that does not need flows to pass 
across its boundaries in support of its steady state (“general equilibrium”). From a thermodynamic point of view this idea is unacceptable. 
According to thermodynamic theory, any open system, which allows flows of matter and energy to cross its boundaries, is capable of 
maintaining itself in steady state only because it “transport” value from its environment to restore the value that has been “consumed” within 
the system and dissipated. Drawing on the analogy with thermodynamics, this paper replaces the traditional systemic analog of the economy, 
which is the closed “circular flow” process, with the steady flow process. According to this analog, any efficient economy is an open system 
both physically and economically requiring a “flow” of economic value to maintain its steady state. In other words, an economically isolated 
system has to be inefficient and is bound to misallocate and overuse environmental resources. Whether the economy behaves as an 
economically isolated (inefficient) or open (efficient) system is an empirical question. However, if real economies are economically open and 
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to report that, based upon this “revolutionary new perspective”, we are now positioned to “reshape economic 
theory and policy”.1  The problems which appear to consistently elude you all is [that] you have failed to 
recognize the mission-critical nature of Axioms IV-VII. 
     Take, for example, a recent reformulation of ecological economics' central thesis from one of your so-called 
“field's” founding fathers, Herman E. (ECONOMICS IN A FULL WORLD, Scientific American, September 2005, Vol. 
293, Issue 3):  
But the facts are plain and uncontestable: the biosphere is finite, nongrowing, closed (except for the 
constant input of solar energy), and constrained by the laws of thermodynamics. Any subsystem, such as 
the economy, must at some point cease growing and adapt itself to a dynamic equilibrium, something 
like a steady state. 
     But are the facts plain and uncontestable? Is the biosphere finite and closed?  No, two strikes, wrong on both 
counts.  Daly has failed, as you have failed, to grasp that greatest truth of all truths.2  Go back and look at those 
axioms again.  Pay attention to Axioms IV and (especially) Axiom V.  Think about it: it's not a closed system, is 
it?  The facts are not plain and uncontestable, are they?  I suspect by now you may feel a bit nauseated, perhaps like 
an obedient sheep who has blindly followed a drunken shepherd over a cliff, in that very brief interval between 
terminal velocity and the rocks just below.  Perhaps by now you are beginning to understand that this letter is 
not a joke.  Please try not to take it personally (in fact, perhaps you may want to imagine that the letter has been 
written to Daly,3 Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, William Kapp,4 Karl Polanyi,5 E.F. Schumacher,6 Røpke,7 
Splash,8 Norgaard,9 Daily,10 McCauley,11 Farley,12 Hawken,13 Constanza,14 Olson,1 Gowdy instead), for this 
                                                                                                                                                                          
efficient, and environmental resources are abused due to the economy's unrestrained material growth, parts of traditional economic theory, 
especially those related to benefit evaluation, will have to be modified. Policy recommendations will be affected in any case because 
internalization, the panacea of resource misallocations, cannot be more than a temporary solution. Instead of opening the economy, 
internalization encloses the harmed resource and saves it by abusing excessively other environmental resources (Amir 1994, abstract). 
1 The policy recommendations of most economists are driven by a view of economic reality embodied in Walrasian general equilibrium theory.  
Ironically, the Walrasian system has been all but abandoned by leading economic theorists.  It has been demonstrated to be theoretically 
untenable, its basic assumptions about human decision making have been empirically falsified, and it consistently makes poor predictions of 
economic behaviour.  The current revolution in welfare economics offers opportunities on two related fronts for an evolutionary perspective on human 
behaviour to reshape economic theory and policy.... Expanding the role of economic analysis beyond stylized market behaviour to focus on well-
being (real utility) has far-reaching consequences for microeconomic policy...  Abandoning the Walrasian model also means rethinking the 
microfoundations approach to the economic analysis of sustainability.  This opens the door for economists to engage with the growing body of 
research on the evolution of whole societies (Gowdy 2006, abstract).  
2 The Socratic maxim that the recognition of our ignorance is the beginning of wisdom has profound significance for our understanding of 
society…. This fundamental fact of man’s unavoidable ignorance of much on which the working of civilization rests has received little 
attention.  Philosophers and students of society have generally glossed it over and treated this ignorance as a minor imperfection which could 
be more or less disregarded…. Perhaps it is only natural that the scientists tend to stress what we do know; but in the social field, where 
what we do not know is often so much more important, the effect of this tendency  may be very misleading  (Hayek 1960, pp 22-23). 
3 DALY is a professor in the School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland. From 1988 to 1994 he was senior economist in the 
environment department of the Work Bank, where he helped to formulate policy guidelines related to sustainable development. He is a co-
founder and associate editor of the journal Ecological Economics and has written several books (Daly 2005).  Also see Daly 1971. 
4 1950. 
5 1944. 
6 1973. 
7 2004 ; 2005. 
8 1999 ; 2007. 
9 1994 ; Nogaard & Bode 1998. 
10 1997. 
11 2006. 
12 Daly & Farley 2004. 
13 1994 ; Hawken, Lovins et. Al 2000.  
14 et al 1997. 
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critique is as applicable to their positions–and countless others–as it is to yours)…. 
     And since it seems that you may not possess sufficient problem solving skills for “whole-systems” studies, I 
will make this critical point regarding the false and sandy foundation of “ecological economics” as simple as 
possible, with two simple figures which compare and contrast the theoretical framework of “ecological 
economics” with the theoretical framework of The Funk-Zweikampf Solution.  My five year old son, William, drew 
them for you, and you will find them in APPENDIX I: THE EARTH.   
 
At the end of m letter to AICIS (mentioned on page 1 of this letter), I noted that, “if this long letter accomplishes 
nothing else, I hope it has at least irrefutably demonstrated that we are all islanders, and all inextricably intertwined and 
inextricably engaged in a non-cooperative game;” this remark ties into the insightful passage from John Nash’s Ph.D. 
dissertation on the cover-page of this letter, and I believe it may be fair to infer that Albert Einstein was aware of the 
nature of the implicit, sub-optimal – yet rational – gambit presented be all Prisoners' Dilemmas:  in the complex 
problem of global economic development, as I have illustrated in our Axioms, the “prisoners” we are unable to 
communicate with are the unknown and unknowable future, including (1) the future agenda and military capabilities of 
foreign nations and terrorist organizations, and (2) unknown planetary uncertainties, such human scientific experiments 
gone awry, super-novas, chaotic orbits, VEI-8 eruptions, and rogue Asteroids.  I will also note that a few of critics have 
pointed out that, later in life, Einstein expressed regret over writing his letters to Roosevelt, but one of the greatest 
lessons in economics is that revealed-preferences (the choices people make and actions they ultimately take) are far more 
reliable and useful than stated preferences (the choices people say they would make, would like to make, or should have 
made).  Yes, Einstein stated that he made a mistake, but of course his mistake may have been in stating that he had made 
a mistake!  
 Although Professor Dasgupta, Mr Gore ,and the growing population of “ecological economics” have rightfully 
acknowledged that we must fight to protect the relative insularity of our ecology, they have failed to grasp that we must 
also fight to protect the relative insularity of our planet from even greater threats, and that makes me nervous.2  When an 
Academy Award and a Nobel Prize are awarded to an individual who is able to popularize evolutionary unstable solutions 
                                                                                                                                                                          
1 Et al 1996. 
2  What is becoming a scarce resource is any sense of the significance of this welter of information. We are losing the sense of what matters, of 
the habits of mind that can be traced to a loss of context; abstract ideas are not easily conveyed absent a recognizable embodiment, and the 
subtext, that which is not said, may be missing (Hayek et al. 1991, p 13). 
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to problems he does not understand, and, moreover, when a critical mass of highly influential people – such as David 
Suzuki– are mobilized in this – though perhaps well-intended – but ultimately misguided effort to change behaviours and 
alter perceptions of reality, it neither bodes well for the future of the United States nor the inhabitants of Earth. For if 
these individuals did grasp the true nature of the problem, they would understand that the ultimate solution they 
ostensibly seek – to save our planet – may actually require greater consumer consumption, greater greenhouse gas 
emissions, etc:  As you are no doubt well aware, although this point seems to pass by many without much consideration, 
GPS, radar, and other communications systems which they enjoy in their cars, which guide oil tankers, aircraft, and 
fishermen alike back safely to home port, are almost entirely the fruits of the U.S. and allied forces military R&D.  How 
soon so many of us forget that, on 12 April 1961, Yuri Alekseyevich Gagarin blasted into outerspace in, quite literally, a 
coldwar era ICBM:  consumer spending (and thus greenhouse emissions) is rocket fuel for the military and NASA R&D 
upon which the future of our civilization depends.  But this sentiment does not appear to be on the rise, in fact, I fear it is 
waning.  As Thomas Schelling noted in his 2005 Sveriges Riksbank Prize Lecture,  
In 1960 the British novelist C. P. Snow said on the front page of the New York Times that unless the nuclear 
powers drastically reduced their nuclear armaments thermonuclear warfare within the decade was a 
“mathematical certainty”,1 
 
and it seems, despite all of our progress, we may be – yet again – enduring this sort of intellectual epidemic which first 
spread through the United States late 19th century,2 but we were fortunate to transition through this problematic period, 
if I may speculate, with logical investigations out of the Chicago School and other forward thinking American institutions 
such as Princeton, Yale, Stanford, MIT, NYU, RAND, The Rockefeller Foundation, and The Institute of Advanced 
Study,3 and it is my hope that these and other institutions will help us transition through this period again. 
                                                
1  p 365. 
2 We seem to be passing through what may be called an exceptional development of the heart without a corresponding development of the 
head.  Through all classes of people there seems to have run a contagious epidemic of sentiment which has arisen from a really high and noble 
moral purpose.  Persons of sensibility, refinement and intelligence have been touched as never before by a strong desire to do for the classes 
below them.  So find and so lofty has unquestionably been the purpose behind this movement, that it seems ungracious, if not unjust, to hint 
at a possible improvement in it; and yet the ascertainment of the causes of things and the susequent remedying of evils can be advanced only 
by the most rigorous, logical, and scientific investigation.  Lofty as the well meaning purpose of many persons may be, still, if founded only 
on a sentimental basis, it may be as dangerous as error (Laughlin 1892, p 2).   
3  Of course I’m limiting my survey to the United States: the extraordinary contributions out of the Scottish Enlightenment, the Austrian 
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In closing, Mr President, I will offer that I followed your presentation of the Medal of Freedom Awards three 
weeks ago with great interest, especially your words in honour of General Peter Pace;1 in fact, I have been invariably 
drawn to these great Awards since 1991, the year your father presented the a Medal of Freedom to F.A. von Hayek.2  If I 
it not too much to ask, I would be grateful if you are able to share these words of thanks with your father, since, despite 
their accolades and achievements, as other writers have rightly noted, the teachings of Hayek and his close friend and 
fellow Austrian, Sir Karl Popper have not received due attention, and I doubt I will ever be able to adequately express 
my debt to their contributions - but I will attempt to do so in this brief valediction: 3 
If I have seen farther, it is by standing on the shoulders of giants, wrote Isaac Newton in a letter to Robert Hooke in 
1676.  Although Newton was referring to his discoveries in optics rather than his more important work on 
gravity and the laws of motion, it is an apt comment on how science, and indeed the whole of civilization, is a 
series of incremental advances, each building on what went on before... 
     But... our understanding doesn't advance just by slow and steady building on previous work.  Sometimes as 
with Copernicus and Einstein, we have to make the intellectual leap to a new world picture.  Maybe Newton 
should have said, “I used the shoulders of giants as a springboard.”4 
 
And in may feeble attempt to express my gratitude to these great defenders of freedom, I will relate that, on 11 
                                                                                                                                                                          
School, the University of Zurich, Humboldt University of Berlin, Cambridge, Oxford, The London School of Economics, Mount Perlin 
Society, and the highly rationalized problem solving skills which developed through centuries of relatively homogoneous Norse and Japanese 
cultural evolution were certainly, at the very least, all equal or greater, each in their own right. 
1 On his final day in uniform, General Pace took a quiet journey to the Vietnam Veterans' Memorial.  He searched the names engraved in the 
sleek granite, and then found a spot where he placed his four stars that had adorned his uniform.  Along with those stars he attached notes 
addressed to the men who died under his first command some four decades ago.  The notes said: "These are yours -- not mine.  With love 
and respect, your platoon leader, Pete Pace."  General Pace ended his military career the same way that he began it -- with love for his 
country and devotion to his fellow Marines.  
           For his selfless service to his country, and for always putting the interests of our men and women in uniform first, I am proud to award the 
Presidential Medal of Freedom to General Pete Pace (Bush 2008). 
2  We honor Professor Friedrich von Hayek for a lifetime of looking beyond the horizon. At a time when many saw socialism as ordained by 
history, he foresaw freedom's triumph. Over 40 years ago, Professor von Hayek wrote that ``the road to serfdom'' was not the road to the 
future or to the political and economic freedom of man. A Nobel laureate, he is widely credited as one of the most influential economic 
writers of our century. Professor von Hayek is revered by the free people of Central and Eastern Europe as a true visionary, and recognized 
worldwide as a revolutionary in intellectual and political thought. How magnificent it must be for him to witness his ideas validated before 
the eyes of the world. We salute him. 
     The people of the United States are indeed indebted... You have touched us. You have enriched us.  You have shaped our Nation's 
destiny.  And you've also shown us the strength and joy of a simple but powerful idea: the idea of freedom (Bush 1991).  
3 My present design… is not to teach the method which each ought to follow for the right conduct of his reason, but solely to describe the way 
in which I have endeavoured to conduct my own…. This tract is put forth merely as a history, or, if you will, as a tale, in which, amid some 
examples worthy of imitation, there will be found, perhaps, as many more which it were advisable not to follow, I hope it will prove useful 
to some without being hurtful to any, and that my openness will find some favour with all.  It is possible I may be mistaken; and it is but a 
little copper and glass, perhaps, that I take for gold and diamonds. I know how very liable we are to delusion in what relates to ourselves, and 
also how much the judgements of our friends are to be suspected when given in our favour (Descartes 1637, pp 1-2). 
4 Hawking 2002 ix. 
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June 2008, just a few minutes past one o'clock in the afternoon, I stood before the small group of searchers remaining in 
the afternoon of the final day of the AICIS conference and said,  
Hello, my name is Matt Funk, I am thirty-nine years old, and I have only solved one significant problem in my 
entire life.  But I am in fact pleased with this result, as the problem that I have solved has remained an open 
problem in economics for over 2,300 years.1 
 
First of all, this introductory remark was intended to emphasize the importance of the discovery over the 
importance of the discoverer,2 for I’m well aware of how difficult these lessons are to learn and, even when grasped, how 
easily they are lost.3  
Moreover, on a practical level, for example, there are more deaths per 10,000 drivers here on Prince Edward 
Island than in any other province in Canada, and I think about this statistic every time my beautiful Canadian wife walks 
heads off for the Queen Elizabeth Hospital, where she has worked as a registered nurse for the past five years.  I also 
consider this statistic every time I get into the car:  I think of my wife, my five year old son, and I also consider the 
completed and nearly completed solutions I’ve been working on over the past decade, buy have yet to publish. How 
unfortunate it would be if they all vanished in a blink of an eye?  It was with a similar thought4 that I sent the following 
email a few hours prior to boarding my flight from Stockholm last month: 
                                                
1 Funk 2008b. 
2  All the great… scientists were intellectually modest; and Newton speaks for them all when he says: ‘I do not know what I may appear to the 
world, but to myself I seem to have been only a boy playing on the seashore, and diverting myself in now and then finding a smoother pebble 
or a prettier shell than ordinary, whilst the great ocean of truth lay all undiscovered before me.’”  
     Moreover, all the great scientists realized that every solution to a scientific problem raises many new and unsolved problems. Our 
knowledge of our ignorance, becomes increasingly conscious, detailed and precise, the more we learn about the world. Scientific research is 
the best method we have for obtaining information about ourselves and about our ignorance. It leads us to the important insight that there 
may be great differences between us with regard to minor details of what wed may perhaps know, yet we are all equal in our infinite 
ignorance (Popper 1992, p 40). 
3 It is the fact that in [economics] no knowledge can be regarded as established once and for all, and that, in fact, knowledge once gained and 
spread is often, not disproved, but simply lost and forgotten…. The reason why in our field knowledge can be so lost is, of course, that is 
never established by experiment, but can be acquired only by following a rather difficult process of reasoning…. The result is that in 
economics you can never establish a truth once and for all but have always to convince every generation anew (Hayek, Bartley, & Kresege 
1991, p 38). 
4 [The wise] will start each day with the thought…  Fortune gives us nothing which we can really own.  Nothing, whether public or private, is 
stable; the destinies of men, no less than those of cities, are in a whirl.  Whatever structure has been reared by a long sequence of years, at the 
cost of great toil and through the great kindness of the gods, is scattered and dispersed in a single day.  No, he who has said ‘a day’ has 
granted too long a postponement to swift misfortune; an hour, an instant of time, suffices for the overthrow of empires.  How often have 
cities in Asia, how often in Achaia, been laid low by a single shock of earthquake? How many towns in Syria, how many in Macedonia, have 
been swallowed up? How often has this kind of devastation laid Cyprus in ruins?  We live in the middle of things which have all been destined 
to die.  Mortal have you been born, to mortals have you given birth.  Reckon on everything, expect everything (Botton 2000, p 91). 
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-------- Original Message --------  
Subject:  Re: Greetings from Stockholm! 
Date:  Tue, 17 Jun 2008 01:11:16 +0000 
From:  matt@funkisland.org 
To:  Godfrey Baldacchino <gbaldacchino@upei.ca> 
 
Here's a copy of my final draft - if Fortuna she twist her hand and thwart my efforts to reach the shores of North 
America again, please do you best to write an introduction, find a publisher, and send proceeds to my son! 
(Have I mentioned the importance of the theoretical implications this paper presents?!?) 
Cheers!  Matt  
But this is not even the type of loss I fear most.  The loss I fear most is the lost of not being discovered, or, 
rather, not being accepted, in the first place.  And there are fairly good reasons for this fear.   
Throughout history, there have been, essentially two types of economists: those who become rich and famous 
and those whom parish in poverty and obscurity, and, unfortunately, I am of the latter type. 
Why is this so? 
Because, as Einstein noted, “Man has an intense desire for assured knowledge. That is why Hume’s clear message 
seemed crushing.”1  Those economists whom recognize and acknowledge Hume’s clear message2 regularly meet poverty 
and obscurity, while those whom cater to man’s crushing desire for certainty reap fortune and fame. 
The Problem of Induction, as we have noted, was first recognized by Hume,3 and Cournot4 was the first economist 
to developed probability theory to the point where he recognized that it was not applicable to economics.  Cournot died 
blind and penniless, while his contemporary, William Stanley Jevons, an economist of nearly no ability, gained fortune 
and fame for assuring speculators of a connection between sunspots and commodity prices.5  And although a tenable 
solution was finally tabled by Popper (both Popper and Hayek, I will note were two great exceptions to the rule above, 
                                                
1 Italics mine, Einstein 1956 p 21-22. 
2  Ever since the beginning of modern science, the best minds have recognized that 'the range of acknowledged ignorance will grow with the 
advance of science.’  Unfortunately, the popular effect of this scientific advance has been a belief, seemingly shared by many scientists, that 
the range of our ignorance is steadily diminishing and that we can therefore aim at more comprehensive and deliberate control of all human 
activities.  It is for this reason that those intoxicated by the advance of knowledge so often become the enemies of freedom (Hayek1945). 
3 1739 
4 1838 
5  See Funk 2007. 
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though they certainly did not find the fortunes of two economists I will shortly note),1 probability theory and inductive 
methods remain in the core curriculum of nearly every economics department and continues to provide false foundations 
for Nobel Laureates, hedge fund managers, and central bankers alike. As Lowenstein keenly observed in When Genius 
Failed: The Rise and Fall of Long-Term Capital Management, his story of two Nobel Laureates, both firm believers and sellers 
of certainty whom gained fortune, fame, and nearly brought the U.S. and global financial markets to a crashing halt, the 
“belief that tomorrow’s risks can be inferred by from yesterday’s prices and volatilities prevails at virtually every 
investment bank and trading desk.”2 
In any case, Mr President, it is out of this fear of being lost or not being discovered at all that I have written this 
letter to you, as I hope that by placing it in your hands it may be more readily preserved. 
And if I have indeed been able to see a bit farther, if you, my fellow Americans, and any other fellow inhabitants 
of Earth should  find my discovery of a any meaningful value,  if I have not mistaken and pyrite and plexi-glass for 
diamonds and gold,3 then not only will I have done so without using the shoulders of these two Austrian intellectual giants 
as springboards,4 for I will have done so without yet climbing within sight of their shoulders. 
 Moreover, despite the fact that these men were often not well-received by the open arms of America, I have 
                                                
1 1959 
2  2000, p 235 
3 My present design… is not to teach the method which each ought to follow for the right conduct of his reason, but solely to describe the way 
in which I have endeavoured to conduct my own…. This tract is put forth merely as a history, or, if you will, as a tale, in which, amid some 
examples worthy of imitation, there will be found, perhaps, as many more which it were advisable not to follow, I hope it will prove useful 
to some without being hurtful to any, and that my openness will find some favour with all.  It is possible I may be mistaken; and it is but a 
little copper and glass, perhaps, that I take for gold and diamonds. I know how very liable we are to delusion in what relates to ourselves, and 
also how much the judgements of our friends are to be suspected when given in our favour (Descartes 1637, pp 1-2). 
4 Most economists enter this market in ney ideas, let me emphasize, in order to obtain ideas and methods for the applications they are making 
of economics to the thousand problems with which they are occupied: these economists are not the suppliers of new ideas but only 
demanders. Their problem is comparable to that of' the automobile buyer: to find a reliable vehicle.  Indeed, they usually end up by buying a 
used, and therefore tested, idea.  
     Those economists who seek to engage in research on the new ideas of the science - to refute or confirm or develop or displace them - are 
in a sense both buyers and sellers of new ideas.  They seek to develop new ideas and persuade the science to accept them, but they also are 
following clues and promises and explorations in the current or preceding ideas of' the science.  It is very costly to enter this market: it takes 
a good deal of time and thought to explore a new idea far enough to discover its promise or its lack of promise.  The history of economics, 
and I assume of every science, is strewn with costly errors: of ideas, so to speak, that wouldn't run far or carry many passengers (Stigler 
1982, pp 529-530). 
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sufficient reason to believe they admired our nation, our independence,1 and the safe anchorage we provided for 
independent thinkers and intellectual rebels2 such as they: 
In 1949 I received an invitation to give the William James Lectures at Harvard.  This led to my first visit to 
America, and it made a tremendous difference to my life.... 
    I liked America from the first, perhaps because I had been somewhat prejudiced against it.  There was in 1950 
a feeling of freedom, of personal independence, which did not exist in Europe and which, I thought, was even 
stronger than in New Zealand, the freest country I knew.... 
     The greatest and most lasting impact of our visit was made by Einstein.  I had been invited to Princeton, and 
read in a seminar a paper on “Indeterminism in Quantum Physics and in Classical Physics”, an outline from a 
much longer paper.  In the discussion Einstein said a few words of agreement, and Bohr spoke at length (going 
on until we were the only two left)...  The fact that Einstein and Bohr came to my lecture I regard as the greatest 
compliment I have ever received. 
     I learned to my surprise that Einstein thought my suggestions concerning simplicity (in Logic der Forschung) had 
been universally accepted, so that everybody now knew that the simpler theory was preferable because of its 
greater power of excluding possible states of affairs; that is, its better testability.... 
     It is difficult to convey the impression made by Einstein's personality.  Perhaps it may be described by saying 
that one felt immediately at home with him, his good sense, his wisdom, and his almost childlike simplicity.  It 
says something for our world, and for America, that so unworldly a man not only survived, but was appreciated and so greatly 
honoured [Italics mine, Popper 1992, pp 146 – 152]. 
 
And finally, Mr President, if I may offer a personal note:  I realize you have been faced with difficult strategic 
                                                
1 On July 4, 1776, our Nation's Founders declared "That these United Colonies are, and of Right, ought to be free and Independent States."  
This declaration marked a great milestone in the history of human freedom.  On the 230th anniversary of the signing of the Declaration of 
Independence, we pay tribute to the courage and dedication of those who created this country, and we celebrate the values of liberty and 
equality that make our country strong. 
           The patriots of the Revolutionary War acted on the beliefs that "all men are created equal" and "that they are endowed by their Creator 
with certain unalienable Rights."  By advancing these ideals, generations of Americans have unleashed the hope of freedom for people in 
every corner of the world. 
           As we celebrate our independence, Americans can take pride in our history and look to the future with confidence.  We offer our 
gratitude to all the American patriots, past and present, who have sought to advance freedom and lay the foundations of peace. Because of 
their sacrifice, this country remains a beacon of hope for all who dream of liberty and a shining example to the world of what a free people 
can achieve.  May God continue to bless the United States of America. 
           NOW, THEREFORE, I, GEORGE W. BUSH, President of the United States of America, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the 
Constitution and laws of the United States, do hereby proclaim July 4, 2006, as Independence Day.  I call upon the people of the United 
States to observe with all due ceremony our Independence Day as a time to honor our Founders and their legacy of freedom and remember 
with thankfulness the sacrifice of our men and women in uniform. 
           IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this twenty-six day of June, in the year of our Lord two thousand six (Bush 
2006). 
2  Einstein’s genius reminds us that a society’s competitive advantage comes not from teaching the multiplication or periodic tables but from 
nurturing rebels…. And, as recent research into Einstein’s personal papers shows, there’s no better glimpse into his offbeat creativity than 
the way he puzzled out the special theory of relativity…. Einstein alienated so many professors that he was unable to earn a doctorate, much less land 
an academic job [italics mine]. At the age of 26, he was working as a third-class examiner at the Swiss patent office in Bern…. Other scientists 
had come close to his insight, but they were too confined by the dogmas of the day [italics mine]. Einstein alone was impertinent enough to discard the 
notion of absolute time, one of the sacred tenets of classical physics since Newton. “Imagination is more important than knowledge,” Einstein 
later said. Indeed, if we are ever going to unravel the further mysteries of dark matter, come up with a unified theory, or discover the true 
nature of energy, we should carve that proclamation above all of our blackboards (Isaacson, 2007, pp 35-36). 
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decisions over the past eight years, and I want to let you know that, after thinking about these and other strategic, 
theoretical, and practical implications while completing the formulation of the theory of value based upon relative 
insularity which I have enclosed herewith, I called my father in Chicago last month to tell him about my exciting 
discovery, and at the end of this conversation, I told him something he had never heard me say before:  I told him I was 
proud to be an American. 
“You should be,” my father said without hesitation, “it’s a great country.” 
Sincerely, 
 
(Matt Funk)
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APPENDIX I:  THE EARTH1 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This excellent drawing represents the theoretical framework of “ecological economics.”   
The blue represents the Earth, the biosphere and all of its inter-connected systems, 
which are, naturally, beholden to the second law of thermodynamics. 
Although “ecological economists” refer to this as a “whole-systems”  
approach; as you will see in Fig. 2, they “forgot” two systems. 
This framework is represented in Axioms I-III.2   
 
 
 
                                                
1 Funk 2008a.  Artwork courtesy of William Matthew Funk © 2008. 
2 See APPENDIX I. 
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Figure 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This excellent drawing represents the theoretical framework of The Funk-Zweikampf Solution. 
Note that, in addition to the axioms represented in the previous drawing (in blue),  
this framework also recognizes two additional, fundamental assumptions: 
(1) political uncertainty (white),  and (2) planetary uncertainty (red). 
As you can see, this is the “bigger picture,”  so to speak.  
This framework is represented in Axioms I-VI.1  
 
 
                                                
1 See APPENDIX I. 
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ABBREVIATIONS & DEFINITIONS 
  Asteroid Tugboat 
An Asteroid Tugboat… is a fully controlled asteroid deflection concept using a robotic spacecraft 
powered by a high efficiency, electric propulsion system (ion or plasma) which docks with and attaches 
to the asteroid, conducts preliminary operations, and then thrusts continuously parallel to the asteroid 
velocity vector until the desired velocity change is achieved.  Based on early warning, provided by 
ground tracking and orbit prediction, it would be deployed a decade or more prior to a potential 
impact.1 
Axiom 
  “Fundamental Ideas”... are the sources of necessary truths (sometimes called “Axioms”).2  
Byr  Billion Years  
ESS  Evolutionary Stable Strategy 
Maynard Smith and Price (1973) introduced the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). 
Initially they were not aware of the relationship between the concept of an ESS and that of a Nash 
equilibrium. Rational game theory looked at mixed strategies as produced by conscious randomization.  
Nash’s interpretation of a mixed equilibrium as a mass action phenomenon was buried in his unpublished 
dissertation and not found in textbooks on game theory.  In biology the mass action interpretation is very 
natural and guided the work on evolutionary stability already from its beginning....  They defined an ESS 
as a strategy prescribed by a symmetric equilibrium point.3 
Funk-Zweikampf Solution 
Our strategic solution is derived through the axiomatic application of our unified theory of value of the 
biological and social sciences,4 generated through the discovery that Value (V) is a derivative function of 
relative insularity (IR): V=f´(IR). 
     IR is formulated with the following variables: Land Area (km2), Elevation (m), Distance from nearest 
Continent (km), Distance from nearest Neighbour (km), Nearest Neighbour Land Area (km2), Renewable Water 
Resources (m3/person/year), Population Density (p/km2), Exclusive Economic Zone Area (km2), International 
Airports (n), Deep Water Harbours (n), Marine Links, (n) Land Links (n), Forests (% km2), Commercial Agriculture 
(% km2), Organic Agriculture (% km2), Subsistence Agriculture (% km2), Nature Preserve (%k m2), Tourist Visits 
(p/yr), Irrigation (m3/person/year & % km2), Industrial Water Consumption (m3/person/year), Organic Water 
Pollutants (grammes/p/day), Food Imports (%), and the following four qualitative inputs: Sovereign Status, 
Constitutional Balance, Cultural Homogeneity, and Military Power.  We calibrate our formulae by adjusting 
relative input weighting in accordance a positive, linear biogeographical correlation between IR and the 
average human life expectancy for the corresponding politico-biogeographic area.5 
GEMS  Globalized Economic Military Superpowers 
Presently, the USA represents the only true player in this arena, but our definition includes all five 
signatory members of the UK-USA agreement (UK, USA, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand), often 
referred to as AUSCANZUKUS, and six other nations which have developed, detonated, and presently 
maintain nuclear weapons (Russia, France, China, India, Pakistan, and North Korea).  
                                                
1  Schweickart et. al., 2003, abstract. 
2 Whewell 1837, reprinted in Butts 1968, p 5. 
3 Selten 1994, p 168 
4 See APPENDIX I 
5  Funk 2008a 
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Myr  Million Years      
Prisoner's Dilemma 
 (a) Al Tucker was on leave at Stanford in the Spring of 1950 and, because of the shortage of offices, he 
was housed in the Psychology Department.  One day a psychologist knocked on his door and asked what 
he was doing.  Tucker replied: “I’m working on game theory.“, and the psychologist asked if he would 
give a seminar on his work. For that seminar, Al Tucker invented the Prisoner’s Dilemma as an example 
of game theory.1 
 (b) The Prisoner's Dilemma... is a game where two players have the option to cooperate or to defect.  If 
both cooperate they receive the reward, R.  If both defect they receive the punishment, P.  If one 
cooperates and the other defects, then the cooperator receives the sucker's payoff, S, while the defector 
receives the9 temptation, T.  The Prisoner's Dilemma is defined by the ranking T>R>P>S. 
      Would you cooperate or defect?  Assuming the other person will cooperate it is better to defect, 
because T>R.  Assuming the other person will defect it is better to defect, because P>S.  Hence, no matter 
what the other person will do it is best to defect. If both players analyze the game in this rational way then they will 
end up defecting.  The dilemma is that they both could have received a higher payoff if they had chosen to cooperate .  
But cooperation is irrational.2 
 (c)  This “collective-risk social dilemma” exists in various social scenarios, the globally most challenging 
one being...climate change.3 
 
Problem of Induction4 
[Problem:] Our foregoing method of reasoning will easily convince us, that there can be no demonstrative 
arguments to prove, that those instances, of which we have had no experience, resemble those, of which we have had 
experience.5 
[Solution:]  According to a widely accepted view... the empirical sciences can be characterized by the 
fact that they use ‘inductive methods’, as they are called. According to this view, the logic of scientific 
discovery would be identical with inductive logic, i. e. with the logical analysis of these inductive 
methods. It is usual to call an inference ‘inductive’ if it passes from singular statements (sometimes also 
called ‘particular’ statements), such as accounts of the results of observations or experiments, to 
universal statements, such as hypotheses or theories. Now it is far from obvious, from a logical point of 
view, that we are justified in inferring universal statements from singular ones, no matter how 
numerous; for any conclusion drawn in this way may always turn out to be false: no matter how many 
instances of white swans we may have observed, this does not justify the conclusion that all swans are 
white. 
     The question whether inductive inferences are justified, or under what conditions, is known as the 
problem of induction. The problem of induction may also be formulated as the question of the validity or 
the truth of universal statements which are based on experience, such as the hypotheses and theoretical 
systems of the empirical sciences....  
     Scientific statements can only attain continuous degrees of probability whose unattainable upper and 
lower limits are truth and falsity’ [Reichenbach, Erkenntnis 1, 1930, p. 186]. At this stage I can 
disregard the fact that the believers in inductive logic entertain an idea of probability that I shall later 
                                                
1 Kuhn 1994, p 161.  For A.W. Tucker's version, see APPENDIX IV: THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA. 
2 Italics mine, May & McLean, 2007, p 8.  Also see APPENDIX I, Cressman 1996, Hauert 2006, Weibull & Salomonsson 2006 
3 Milinski et. al. 2008, p 2291. 
4 Also see Cournot 1838, Reichenbach 1930, 1966, Reichenbach et. al.  1971, Russell 1903, 1908, 1913, 1919, 1948,Ludwig et. al. 1993, 
and Wittgenstein 1969.  Most works by Popper address this problem from various angles and within variable contexts. 
5 Italics mine, Hume 1739, Book I, Vol I,  p 137. 
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reject as highly unsuitable for their own purposes.  I can do so because the difficulties mentioned are not 
even touched by an appeal to probability. For if a certain degree of probability is to be assigned to 
statements based on inductive inference, then this will have to be justified by invoking a new principle of 
induction, appropriately modified.  And this new principle in its turn will have to be justified, and so on. 
     Nothing is gained, moreover, if the principle of induction, in its turn, is taken not as ‘true’ but only 
as ‘probable’. In short, like every other form of inductive logic, the logic of probable inference, or 
‘probability logic’, leads...to an infinite regress.1 
(exempli gratia: a)  There is dangerous innocence in the expectation of a future formed on the basis of 
probability. Any accident to which a human has been subject, however rare, however distant in time, is a 
possibility we must ready ourselves for.2  
(exempli gratia: b) The assumption that economists can find predictable solutions to economic problems 
is undoubtedly the most inhibiting force in… economics. It has led to the increasing isolation of 
theoretical economists from the day-to-day practitioners of the subject—the actual participants in an 
economy, the consumers and the producers.3  
(exempli gratia: c) There is a problem in inference well-known as the problem of induction. It is a 
problem that has been haunting science for a long time, but hard science has not been as harmed by it as 
the social sciences, particularly economics, even more the branch of financial economics.4 
(exempli gratia: d) Kant, in his Critique of Pure Reason, asserted under the influence of Hume that pure 
speculation or reason, whenever it ventures into a field in which it cannot possibly be checked by 
experience, is liable to get involved in contradictions or ‘anti-anomies’ and to produce what he 
unambiguously described as ‘mere fancies’ ; ‘nonsense’ ; ‘illusions’ ; ‘a sterile dogmatism’ ; and ‘a 
superficial pretension to the knowledge of everything.’5  
 (exempli gratia: e) We shall never attain scientific consensus concerning the systems that are being 
exploited. There have been a number of spectacular failures to exploit resources sustainably, but to date 
there is no agreement about the causes of these failures....   
     The great difficulty in achieving consensus concerning past events and a fortiori in prediction of future 
events is that controlled and replicated experiments are impossible to perform in large-scale systems.... 
     Once we free ourselves from the illusion that science or technology (if lavishly funded) can provide a 
solution to resource or conservation problems, appropriate action becomes possible.6 
RIS  Relatively Insular States 
This category includes sovereign island nations, sub-national island jurisdictions, insular provinces (i.e. 
Newfoundland & Labrador), states (i.e. Hawaii), municipalities (i.e. Vancouver Island), and relatively 
insular jurisdictions (i.e. The Alpine Convention region)  Given relative insularity (see Axiom VII), we 
divide geopolitical regions into (1) RIS and (2) GEMS, but in reality, naturally, the true relative 
insularity of each region lies along a sliding scale with a true GEMS at one end (the United States) and a 
true RIS, such as the big island of Hawaii at the other.7  
Strategic Equilibrium 
What do I mean by “strategic equilibrium”? Very roughly, the players in a game are said to be in strategic 
equilibrium (or simply equilibrium) when their play is mutually optimal: when the actions and plans of each 
                                                
1 Popper 1959, pp 31-35. 
2 Botton 2000, p 90. 
3 Hayek 1991, p 9. 
4 Taleb 2004, p 117. 
5 Popper, 1945, vII, p38. 
6 Ludwig et. al. 1993. 
7  Funk 2008a 
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player are rational in the given strategic environment – i.e., when each knows the actions and plans of 
the others. For formulating and developing the concept of strategic equilibrium, John Nash was awarded 
the 1994 Prize in Economics Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel, on the fiftieth anniversary of the 
publication of John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern’s Theory of Games and Economic Behavior.1  
Theory 
Every scientific theory is a system of sentences…or ASSERTED STATEMENTS or, for short, simple 
STATEMENTS.2 
Tragedy of the Commons 
(a) William Forster Lloyd (1794-1852)... made a lasting if long unrecognized mark in economics...  
From 1832 to 1837 Lloyd held the Drummond chair of political economy at the University of Oxford.  
A collection of his lectures... were first published in 1833 in Oxford under the title Two Lectures on the 
Checks to Population.... The chief original contribution in Lloyd's discussion of population issues is his 
recognition and incisive analysis of the deleterious consequences that ensue “when the constitution of 
society is such that as to diffuse the effects of individual acts throughout the community at large, instead 
of appropriating them to the individuals, by whom they are respectively committed.”  Lloyd's discussion 
of this problem... [is] best known to modern readers through Garrett Hardin's influential 1968 article... 
“The Tragedy of the Commons” .3 
(b)  It is fair to say that most people who anguish over the population problem are trying to find a way to 
avoid the evils of overpopulation without relinquishing any of the privileges they now enjoy.4  They 
think that farming the seas or developing new strains of wheat will solve the problem -- technologically. I 
try to show here that the solution they seek cannot be found. The population problem cannot be solved 
in a technical way, any more than can the problem of winning the game of tick-tack-toe (Hardin 1968).  
(c)  Scientific certainty and consensus in itself would not prevent overexploitation and destruction of 
resources.  Many practices continue even in cases where there is abundant scientific evidence that they 
are ultimately destructive.  An outstanding example is the use of irrigation in arid lands. Approximately 
3000 years ago in Sumer, the once highly productive wheat crop had to be replaced by barley because 
barley was more salt-resistant. The salty soil was the result of irrigation. E. W. Hilgard pointed out in 
1899 that the consequences of planned irrigation in California would be similar. His warnings were not 
heeded. Thus 3,000 years of experience and a good scientific understanding of the phenomena, their 
causes, and the appropriate prophylactic measures are not sufficient to prevent the misuse and 
consequent destruction of resources. 5 
                                                
1  All italics Aumann's 2005, p 352. 
2  Tarski 1941, p 3. 
3 Population Council 1980, p 473 
4 To keep downtown shoppers temperate in their use of parking space we introduce parking meters for short periods, and traffic fines for 
longer ones. We need not actually forbid a citizen to park as long as he wants to; we need merely make it increasingly expensive for him to 
do so. Not prohibition, but carefully biased options are what we offer him. A Madison Avenue man might call this persuasion; I prefer the 
greater candor of the word coercion.  
      Coercion is a dirty word to most liberals now, but it need not forever be so. As with the four-letter words, its dirtiness can be cleansed 
away by exposure to the light, by saying it over and over without apology or embarrassment. To many, the word coercion implies arbitrary 
decisions of distant and irresponsible bureaucrats; but this is not a necessary part of its meaning. The only kind of coercion I recommend is 
mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon by the majority of the people affected.  
      To say that we mutually agree to coercion is not to say that we are required to enjoy it, or even to pretend we enjoy it. Who enjoys taxes? 
We all grumble about them. But we accept compulsory taxes because we recognize that voluntary taxes would favor the conscienceless. We 
institute and (grumblingly) support taxes and other coercive devices to escape the horror of the commons (Hardin 1968).  
5 Ludwig et. al. 1993. 
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1. 
The Confederation Bridge, linking Prince Edward Island (PEI) to New Brunswick (NB) across the Northumberland Strait... has probably 
been the most keenly debated and most traumatic event in the modern history of PEI, Canada's smallest province (Calhoun 1989; Weale 
1991; Begley 1993; Shea 1993; Johnston 1995; Macdonald 1997) (p 329). 
2. 
In A Geography of Islands, Royle dedicates the first photo in his book to the 14-km Confederation Bridge, linking PEI (and its 140,000 
citizens) to mainland New Brunswick since 1997 (Royle 2001, 13). To judge from the lead-up, many Islanders held high hopes from the 
completed structure. ‘Our Island province is about to experience a transition to a new frontier of vigorous expansion and renewed 
community vitality,’ PEI Premier Pat Binns predicted at the official opening. ‘Our traditional sectors of agriculture and the fishery will be 
enhanced by a marked improvement in transportation infrastructure (Journal-Pioneer 1997). 
     The decision to bridge the gap (that is, the Northumberland Strait) was by no means universally popular, however (Royle 2001, 114; 
Begley 1993). Prominent islanders like Betty Howatt campaigned vigorously against the bridge—because she saw ‘a loosening of the social 
fabric in the province’ and claimed that ‘people no longer have that sense of place that they once had’ (The Guardian, PEI, 8 November 
2003). In a January 1988 plebiscite, 40 percent of islanders voted against a fixed link. For many of these, a fixed attachment was a violation 
of a natural order of things; a forced and permanent alternation of an intimate and fundamental spatiality (e.g., Weale 1991, 82). A key 
perceived threat was to the impact that a bridge would have on the island's unique and distinct ‘way of life.’ The latter may escape 
definition, although Ansel Ferguson, an island fisherman, describes it as ‘a little more friendliness, a little more community, a little less 
crime’ (Calhoun 1989, 19). Critics argued that easy access to the island province would damage the tranquility, natural beauty and charm of 
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methodologists are put into practice, provided they are of practical use for research. The dominance of orthodoxy is reduced. But at the 
same time the competition between papers is intensified, so that only methodological concerns held to be useful by practical economists 
have an impact on the profession (p 9).  
Frey, B. S. (2002). Publishing as Prostitution? Choosing Between One‘s Own Ideas and Academic Failure. Published in: Public Choice Vol. 116, 2003, 
205-223: Institut für Empirische Wirtschaftsforschung, Universität Zürich. 
Abstract:  Survival in academia depends on publications in refereed journals. Authors only get their papers accepted if they intellectually 
prostitute themselves by slavishly following the demands made by anonymous referees without property rights on the journals they advise. 
Intellectual prostitution is neither beneficial to suppliers nor consumers. But it is avoidable. The editor (with property rights on the journal) 
should make the basic decision of whether a paper is worth publishing or not. The referees only give suggestions on how to improve the 
paper. The author may disregard this advice. This reduces intellectual prostitution and produces more original publications.  
Frey, B. S. (2007). Evaluierungen, Evaluierungen ... Evaluitis. Perspektiven Der  Wirtschaftspolitik, 8(3) 207-220.  
Abstract: In the sciences the outside evaluation of past performances of universities, faculties, departments, research groups and of 
individuals has become more and more frequent, nearly incessant. It could be said that the sciences are afflicted with Evaluitis, a creeping 
and widespread illness. Besides the obvious costs that arise for those being evaluated and for those doing the evaluation there are additional 
costs that weigh heavily but are usually disregarded: incentives are distorted systematically and ossification is promoted. Furthermore, the 
whole decision approach is wrongly conceived. For these reasons there are too many and too thorough evaluations. A useful alternative is an 
appropriate design of institutions guiding incentives and a careful selection of persons - who thereafter should be free to pursue their tasks.  
Frey, B. S., & Eichenberger, R. (1992). The Political economy of stabilization programmes in developing countries. Paris: OECD Development Centre.  
Frey, B., & Bohnet, I. (1997). Identification in democratic society. Journal of Socio-Economics, 26(1), 25-38.  
Abstract: Identification increases cooperation and fairness (“other-regarding” behaviour) in Prisoner's Dilemma and Dictator Games. While 
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identification explains all the difference in behaviour in nonstrategic interactions, face-to face communication further raises cooperation in 
strategic settings. This “cooperation-increasing” effect must be traded-off against the “equality-decreasing” effect of communication. 
Allowing for partial communication only—which prevails in large number settings—our experimental results indicate that discussion 
produces unequal distributions of outcomes to the disadvantage of those excluded from the interaction. Substituting identification for 
communication is relevant in democracy for all distributive questions and for public good type settings if equality is valued higher than a 
partial increase of “other-regardedness.” 
Frey, B. S., & Stutzer, A. (2000). Happiness, Economy and Institutions. The Economic Journal, 110(466), 918-938.  
Abstract:  Institutional factors in the form of direct democracy (via initiatives and referenda) and federal structure (local autonomy) 
systematically and sizeably raise self-reported individual well-being in a cross-regional econometric analysis. This positive effect can be 
attributed to political outcomes closer to voters' preferences, as well as to the procedural utility of political participation possibilities. 
Moreover, the results of previous microeconometric well-being functions for other countries are generally supported. Unemployment has a 
strongly depressing effect on happiness. A higher income level raises happiness, however, only to a small extent.  
Fuller, S. (2003). Kuhn vs. Popper. Cambridge, UK: Icon Books, Ltd. 
Funk, M. (2008a). On the Problem of Sustainable Economic Development I: The Funk-Zweikampf Solution to this Prisoner's Dilemma   Introducing a Unified 
Theory of  Value for the Biological and Social Sciences  in an Open Letter to the Åland International Institute of Comparative Island Studies.  AICIS. 
Published online 8 June 2008: http://www.aicis.ax/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=6&Itemid=18 
 - - - .  (2008b). On the Problem of Connectivity: Branding Insularity.  A seminar delivered 11 June 2008, 1:00 p.m., at the Åland International 
Institute of Comparative Island Studies 2nd Annual Conference, “Islands of Competence: Branding Identities in a Globalized World”, The 
Parliamentary Building, Mariehamn, Åland. 
- - - .   (2007a). On the problem of hollywood economics: de vany's error—george lucas knows something.  FIND Working paper. 
 Abstract:  Hayek (1991) lamented the difficulty in distinguishing between economics and excrement, and Hemingway (1958) noted “The 
most essential gift for a good writer is a built-in, shock-proof, bullshit detector.” In this spirit and within the context of Frankfurt's (2004) 
Theory of Bullshit, this paper constructs a bullshit detector for economics. This apparatus is carefully calibrated to detect the Seven Deadly 
Sins of 'Hollywood Economics': Hubris, Intellectual Dishonesty, Greed, Mathematical Mania, Physics Fetishes, Conditions of Emptiness, 
and Sunspots.  We trace the philosophical and methodological origin of these traits to its source, The Problem of Induction, then illustrate with 
examples from Plato to the present, including detailed analysis from the illuminating cases of Long Term Capital Management and William 
Stanley Jevons' sunspot theory. Furthermore, we demonstrate the contemporary effectiveness of this apparatus by detecting hereto 
undetected economic bullshit, namely Arthur de Vany's (2004) Hollywood Economics: How Extreme Uncertainty Shapes the Film Industry. In the 
process, we falsify de Vany's 'Nobody knows anything' theory and advance  our replacement theory: George Lucas knows something.  
- - - .   (2007b). On the problem of global warming: a brief history of a new & unpopular theory in an open letter to john gillis. FIND working paper. 
 Abstract:  Funk's (forthcoming) theory of The Problem of Global Warming forwards the hypothesis that 'global warming' is not in fact limited 
to ecological distress induced through the consumption of superheating fossil fuels—but that is merely a single symptom of far more significant 
problems, which stem from the Problem of Induction.  This paper traces the history, evolution, and development of this new and unpopular 
theory.        
- - - .   (2007c). On the problem of dependent people:  natural resource valuation errors in atlantic canadian island jurisdictions.  FIND working paper.  
- - - .   (2006d). Personal Correspondence. 
-----Original Message----- 
From: Matt Funk <Mfunk@upei.ca> 
To: Doherty, Peter 
Sent: Sun Oct 28 20:44:21 2007 
Subject: Thomas Kuhn & Karl Popper 
 
Greetings Dr Doherty....I am researching a theory that the rejection of Karl Popper's logic and methods and general acceptance (in a 
popular sense) of  Thomas Kuhn's logic and methods have been detrimental to science, especially social sciences such as economics.  
     Nearly a dozen Nobel Laureates have thanked Popper and acknowledged his great influence upon their work: most notably, of course, is 
F.A. von Hayek's Sveriges Riksbank Prize Lecture and, perhaps the most notable example in your field may be revealed in Eccles' Nobel 
biography.  
     I have only been able to discover one Nobel Laureate who acknowledged Kuhn's influence and, curiously, this noble individual (whom of 
course is you!) acknowledged both Popper and Kuhn: "I was influenced early on by reading Arthur Koestler and Edward de Bono, and more 
recently by the writings of Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn." 
     So, naturally, I'm very curious to know if, after nearly a decade, the balance of this influence or your opinions regarding these two 
philosophers of science has changed?  
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     I thank you very much for your time and consideration regarding this matter, as I am inclined to believe the long-term prospects of 
human survival may hang in the balance to the ultimate answer to this debate.  
     Any words of wisdom you are able to offer on this topic would be greatly appreciated. 
Sincerely...Matt Funk 
--- 
From:Doherty, Peter 
To:Mfunk@upei.ca 
Date:10/28/07 11:58 pm  
Subject: Re: Thomas Kuhn & Karl Popper   
 A long time since I've read either. Popper's views re falsification of a null hypothesis seem correct to me. Much of the world's worst science 
is done by people who are determined to prove a point. Kuhn's idea of the paradigm shift is spot on.  
 
Peter C. Doherty, 
Department of Immunology, 
St Jude Children's Research Hospital, 
332 North Lauderdale, 
Memphis TN 38105 
Tel 901-495-3470 
Fax 901-495-3107 
also at: pcd@unimelb.edu.au 
- - - . (forthcoming). On the problem of global warming: a  solution for william funk, albert gore and richard branson.  1156 pages. 
 Abstract:  This exhaustive manuscript presents a solution to The Problem of Global  Warming.  Our discovery concludes that, contrary to 
popular opinion, “The Problem of Global Warming,” is not ecological distress due to the superheating of the Earth, it is merely a single 
symptom of far more significant, inter-related problems, which are synonymous to The Problem of Sustainable Economic Development.  
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Gold, R. E. (2001). SHIELD: a comprehensive earth-protection architecture. Advances in Space Research, 28(8), 1149-1158.  
Abstract: The greatest natural threat to the long-term survivability of mankind is an asteroid or comet impact with the Earth. SHIELD is an 
architectural concept for a comprehensive Earth defense system designed to discover, catalog, calculate orbits of near-Earth objects, and to 
deflect potential impactors. SHIELD consists of Sentries, Soldiers, and an Earth Control Center. Sentries are spacecraft designed to search 
and locate NEOs of all types. Sentries maximize the lead-time for a potential impact, which simplifies the task of the Soldiers to deflect the 
object. Sentry spacecraft determine the orbit of each object, and compare it with the onboard database of known NEOs. The results are kept 
in a distributed space-Earth database. Soldier spacecraft deflect or disperse the potential impactor. Several mitigation methods have been 
compared by their specific impulse. Each technique requires some development to be feasible. These techniques can be categorized into 
“rendezvous” in which the Soldier physically lands on the NEO and “intercept”. The required number of Soldiers and their locations has been 
examined. SHIELD has clearly shown that an Earth-protection system is practical and that a full system could be built within a few years. 
Indeed, very capable Sentries can be launched today.  
Goldsmith, F. B. (1973). The ecologist's role in development for tourism: a case study in the Caribbean. Biological Journal of the Linnean Society, 
5(3), 265-287.  
Abstract:  Ecologists are increasingly in demand to provide both background information to development and to conduct validatory studies 
prior to funding. This paper describes an advisory study conducted on the Caribbean island of Mustique prior to development for tourism. It 
is argued that the ecologist uses biological as well as physical indicators to assess suitability of different areas for development and to 
anticipate possible problems. In this study the primary environmental determinants and biological and human factors have been interpreted 
to identify the distribution and degree of seriousness of exposure, erosion potential and water yield and quality. The compatibility of 
physical and ecological factors with different categories of proposed development have been assessed, and maps of vegetation, soil and 
exposure transferred onto gridded overlays. The use of these overlays combined with a consideration of the compatibilities permitted the 
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degree of restraint to the various categories of development to be presented in map form. The problems that are likely to be encountered as 
a result of development are discussed, and finally it is suggested that the development be subjected to regular ecological monitoring.  
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 Abstract: Pollinators are required for producing 15–30% of the human food supply, and farmers rely on managed honey bees throughout 
the world to provide these services. Yet honey bees are not always the most efficient pollinators of all crops and are declining in various 
parts of the world. Crop pollination shortages are becoming increasingly common. We found that behavioral interactions between wild and 
honey bees increase the pollination efficiency of honey bees on hybrid sunflower up to 5-fold, effectively doubling honey bee pollination 
services on the average field. These indirect contributions caused by interspecific interactions between wild and honey bees were more than 
five times more important than the contributions wild bees make to sunflower pollination directly. Both proximity to natural habitat and 
crop planting practices were significantly correlated with pollination services provided directly and indirectly by wild bees. Our results 
suggest that conserving wild habitat at the landscape scale and altering selected farm management techniques could increase hybrid 
sunflower production. These findings also demonstrate the economic importance of interspecific interactions for ecosystem services and 
suggest that protecting wild bee populations can help buffer the human food supply from honey bee shortages. 
46 of 66 
 
 Photo: A wild, native bee (Svastra obliqua expurgata) forages on a sunflower. Honey bees that interact with wild, native bees are up to five 
times more efficient in pollinating sunflowers. Protecting wild bees may help buffer the human food supply from reduced pollination 
resulting from honey bee shortages. Conservation measures for wild bees include maintaining and restoring natural habitats and adopting 
bee-friendly farming practices. Image courtesy of Sarah S. Greenleaf.  
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Theoretical Population Biology, 69(3), 339-348.  
Abstract:  Economists and psychologists have been testing Nash equilibrium predictions of game theory models of human behavior. In 
many instances, humans do not conform to the predictions. These results are of great interest to biologists because they also raise questions 
about well-known ESS models of cooperation. Cooperation in certain one-shot, anonymous interactions, and a willingness to punish others 
at a net cost to oneself are some of the most intriguing deviations from standard theory. One proposed explanation for these results that is 
receiving increasing attention invokes the cultural group selection of ‘other regarding’ social norms. We critically review this explanation. 
We conclude that experimental results reveal limits in two implicit models of cognitive structure commonly employed by economists and 
evolutionary biologists.  
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Hauert, C. (2006). Spatial effects in social dilemmas. Journal of  Theoretical Biology, 240(4), 627-636.  
Abstract:  Social dilemmas and the evolutionary conundrum of cooperation are traditionally studied through various kinds of game 
theoretical models such as the prisoner's dilemma, public goods games, snowdrift games or by-product mutualism. All of them exemplify 
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situations which are characterized by different degrees of conflicting interests between the individuals and the community. In groups of 
interacting individuals, cooperators produce a common good benefitting the entire group at some cost to themselves, whereas defectors 
attempt to exploit the resource by avoiding the costly contributions. Based on synergistic or discounted accumulation of cooperative benefits 
a unifying theoretical framework was recently introduced that encompasses all games that have traditionally been studied separately (Hauert, 
Michor, Nowak, Doebeli, 2005. Synergy and discounting of cooperation in social dilemmas. J. Theor. Biol., in press.). Within this 
framework we investigate the effects of spatial structure with limited local interactions on the evolutionary fate of cooperators and 
defectors. The quantitative effects of space turn out to be quite sensitive to the underlying microscopic update mechanisms but, more 
general, we demonstrate that in prisoner's dilemma type interactions spatial structure benefits cooperation—although the parameter range 
is quite limited—whereas in snowdrift type interactions spatial structure may be beneficial too, but often turns out to be detrimental to 
cooperation.  
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problem of how to allocate “given” resources if “given” is taken to mean given to a single mind which deliberately solves the problem set by 
these “data.” It is rather a problem of how to secure the best use of resources known to any of the members of society, for ends whose 
relative importance only these individuals know.  Or, to put it briefly, it is a problem of the utilization of knowledge not given to anyone in 
its totality.  This character of the fundamental problem has, I am afraid, been rather obscured than illuminated by many of the recent 
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It is the fact that in [economics] no knowledge can be regarded as established once and for all, and that, in fact, knowledge once gained and 
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spread is often, not disproved, but simply lost and forgotten…. The reason why in our field knowledge can be so lost is, of course, that is 
never established by experiment, but can be acquired only by following a rather difficult process of reasoning…. The result is that in 
economics you can never establish a truth once and for all but have always to convince every generation anew (p 38). 
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 Abstract:  Varietal data from 27 crop species from five continents were drawn together to determine overall trends in crop varietal 
diversity on farm. Measurements of richness, evenness, and divergence showed that considerable crop genetic diversity continues to be 
maintained on farm, in the form of traditional crop varieties. Major staples had higher richness and evenness than nonstaples. Variety 
richness for clonal species was much higher than that of other breeding systems. A close linear relationship between traditional variety 
richness and evenness (both transformed), empirically derived from data spanning a wide range of crops and countries, was found both at 
household and community levels. Fitting a neutral "function" to traditional variety diversity relationships, comparable to a species 
abundance distribution of "neutral ecology," provided a benchmark to assess the standing diversity on farm. In some cases, high dominance 
occurred, with much of the variety richness held at low frequencies. This suggested that diversity may be maintained as an insurance to meet 
future environmental changes or social and economic needs. In other cases, a more even frequency distribution of varieties was found, 
possibly implying that farmers are selecting varieties to service a diversity of current needs and purposes. Divergence estimates, measured as 
the proportion of community evenness displayed among farmers, underscore the importance of a large number of small farms adopting 
distinctly diverse varietal strategies as a major force that maintains crop genetic diversity on farm. 
Jarvie, I. C., & Pralong, S. (1999). Popper's Open society after fifty years. London ; New York: Routledge.  
 1.  
In intellectual circles Popper was very much admired. But because The Open Society and Its Enemies was hostile to so much academic 
pretension it was treated less than respectfully by those in the various specialties upon whose turf it trod (p 6). 
2.  
In 1950, Popper went to Harvard to deliver the prestigious William James lectures. During his time in the States he appears to have given a 
talk at the University of Chicago, where Strauss taught. Strauss told Voegelin that the talk “was very bad,” “the most washed-out, lifeless 
positivism” (Emberly and Cooper 1993: 67), and inquired of his opinion of Popper. Voegelin replied with a vicious letter. He reports having 
reluctantly read Popper because so many people insist his Open Society is a masterpiece. His judgment is that the book is “impudent, 
dilettantish crap. Every single sentence is a scandal . . .” (ibid.). Noting that Popper takes the concept of open society from Bergson, he 
comments that Bergson did not develop it “for the sole purpose that the coffeehouse scum might have some-thing to botch.” Voegelin 
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believed that Bergson would have thought that “Popper’s idea of the open society is ideological rubbish” (ibid.). Voegelin is only just getting 
started. He accuses Popper of “impertinent disregard for the achievements in this particular problem area [the history of political thought]” 
(Emberly and Cooper 1993: 68) and of being unable to reproduce accurately the ideas of Plato and Hegel. Popper is “a primitive ideological 
brawler.” Voegelin then strings more epithets together, “a failed intellectual,” “rascally impertinent, loutish; in terms of technical 
competence as a piece in the history of thought, it is dilettantish, and as a result is worthless” (Emberley and Cooper 1993: 67). The reader 
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A. adj. 
1. a. Of or pertaining to an island; inhabiting or situated on an island. 1611 COTGR., Insulaire, Insular, Iland-like; of, or belonging to, an 
Iland. 1669 GALE Crt. Gentiles I. II. vi. 73 In ancient times..they called every Insular Prince by the name of Neptune. 1796 BURKE Regic. Peace i. Wks. 
VIII. 151 The names and other..signs of approximation, rather augmented than diminished our insular feuds. 1867 FREEMAN Norm. Conq. I. ii. 29 The 
insular  Teutons showed themselves the most zealous of missionaries. 
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c. Path. insular sclerosis. ‘Moxon's term for Sclerosis, disseminated’ (Syd. Soc. Lex. 1886).  
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OED. (1997). Skepticism, scepticism.  Oxford English Dictionary. 
A seeker of truth. One who, like Pyrrho and his followers in Greek antiquity…, one who holds that there are no adequate grounds for 
certainty as to the truth of any proposition… Those who deny the competence of reason, or the existence of a justification for certitude, 
outside the limits of experience. The difference between the two usages becomes clearer when considering ‘sceptic’s’ Latin origin 
(scepticus): inquiring, reflective, assumed by the disciples of Phyrrho as their distinctive epithet… to look out.  
Okwi, P.O., Ndeng'e, G., Kristjanson, P., Arunga, M., Notenbaert, A., Omolo, A.,  Henninger, N., Benson, T., Kariuki, P., & Owuor, J. 
(2007).  Spatial determinants of poverty in rural Kenya. Published online on October 17, 2007. Edited by Partha Sarathi Dasgupta, 
University of Cambridge, Cambridge, United Kingdom, and accepted August 6, 2007 (received for review February 6, 2007). 
PNAS | October 23, 2007 | vol. 104 | no. 43 | 16769-16774. 
 
 Map: Economic map of Kenya. Poverty is not uniform across the country but depends on a host of geographic factors such as soil type and 
elevation.  Okwi et al. analyze the effect of Kenyan geography on income.  
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“Lies are necessary, Plato asserts, ‘if your herd is to reach highest perfection’ ; for this needs ‘arrangements that must be kept secret from all 
butt the rulers, if we wish to keep the herd of guardians really free from disunion’. Furthermore, Plato “decrees that the rulers should 
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fabricate, for the purpose of mating the young auxiliaries, ‘an ingenious system of balloting, so that the persons who have been disappointed 
.. may blame their bad luck, and not the rulers’, who are, secretly, to engineer the ballot" (Popper 1945, Vol. II,, p 150). 
2. 
“Aristotle’s thought is entirely dominated by Plato’s. Somewhat grudgingly, he followed his great teacher as closely as his temperament 
permitted, not only in his general political outlook but practically everywhere. So he endorsed, and systematized, Plato’s naturalistic theory 
of slavery : ‘Some men are by nature free, and others slaves and for the later, slavery is fitting as well as just… A man who is by nature not 
his own, but another’s, is by nature a slave… Hellenes do not like to call themselves slaves, but confine this term to barbarians… The slave 
is totally devoid of any faculty of reasoning’, while free women have just a very little of it. (We owe to Aristotle’s criticisms and 
denunciations most of our knowledge of the Athenian movement against slavery. By arguing against the fighters for freedom, he preserved 
some of their utterances.)" (Ibid p 3).  
Polanyi, K. (1944) The great transformation. New York/Toronto: Rinehart & Company Inc.  
Popper, K. R. (1999). All life is problem solving [Alles Leben ist ProblemloÞ sen.] . London ; New York: Routledge. 
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 - - - . (1945). The open society and its enemies. London: G. Routledge & Sons, Ltd.  
1.  
open societies, closed societies:  
These terms were introduced by Karl Popper in his book The Open Society and its Enemies (1945), and further explored in The Poverty of 
Historicism (1957). Popper argued that both science and human history are essentially indeterminate and fluid. Applied to social theory, this 
produced Popper's lively and devastating attack on historicism. Theories such as those of Plato, Hegel, and Marx, which proposed the 
existence of laws of history and a knowable human destiny, were dismissed by Popper as scientifically insupportable and politically 
dangerous. He proposed that all such theories would lead to authoritarian and inhumane regimes, which he called closed societies because 
they were closed to the normal processes of change. Open societies by contrast were based on the activity, creativity, and innovation of 
many individuals, and would develop unpredictably through piecemeal social engineering. They are those societies in which social policies 
are monitored for unintended consequences, openly criticized, and altered in the light of such criticism. Such societies must be both liberal 
and democratic, in the sense that it must be possible to remove from office rulers who fail to respond to justified criticism.1  
2. 
For the Open Society (about 430 B.C.):  
Although only a few may originate a policy, we are all able to judge it.  
PERICLES OF ATHENS  
 
Against the Open Society (about 80 years later):  
The greatest principle of all is that nobody, whether male or female, should be without a leader. Nor should the mind of anybody be 
habituated to letting him do anything at all on his own initiative ; neither out of zeal, nor even playfully. But in war and in the midst of 
peace—to his leader he shall direct his eye and follow him faithfully. And even in the smallest matter he should stand under leadership. Fo 
example, he should get up, or move, or wash, or take his meals… only if he has been told to do so. In  
a word, he should teach his soul, by long habit, never to dream of acting independently, and to become utterly incapable of it.  
PLATO OF ATHENS  
(Popper 1945, Vol. I, p 7 ) 
3. 
The development of thought since Aristotle could, I think, be summed up by saying that every discipline, as long as it used the Aristotelian 
method of definition, has remained arrested in a state of empty verbiage and barren scholasticism, and that the degree to which the various 
sciences have been able to make any progress depended on the degree to which they have been able to get rid of this essentialist method. 
(this is why so much of our ‘social science’ still belongs to the Middle Ages.) This discussion of this method will have to be a little abstract, 
owing to the fact that the problem has been so thoroughly muddled by Plato and Aristotle, whose influence has given rise to such deep-
rooted prejudices that the prospect of dispelling them does not seem very bright. (Popper 1945, Vol. II, p 9).  
4. 
see Soros (2006) 
 
1"open societies and closed societies" A Dictionary of Sociology. John Scott and Gordon Marshall. Oxford University Press 2005. Oxford 
Reference Online. Oxford University Press. 
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- - - . (1956). ON THE NON-EXISTENCE OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD. (preface from 1956 edition, Vol. I of the Postscript to 1983 edition of 
The Logic of Scientific Discovery edited by W.W. Bartley III ed., ). London: Routledge. 
- - - . (1962). Conjectures and refutations : The growth of scientific knowledge (First Edition Preface from the 1963 Routledge edition ed.).  
- - - . (1963). Conjectures and refutations : The growth of scientific knowledge (Originally published: 5th ed., rev. London ; New York : 2002. ed.). 
London ; New York: Routledge Classics. 
- - - . (1992). In search of a better world [Auf der Suche nach einer besseren Welt.] (Laura J. Bennett, with additional material by Melitta Mew 
Trans.). London ; New York: Routledge.  
 1. 
 Men, animals, plants, even unicellular organisms are constantly active. They are trying to improve their situation, or at least to avoid its 
deterioration. Even when asleep, the organism is actively maintaining the state of sleep: the depth (or else the shallowness) of sleep is a 
condition actively created by the organism, which sustains sleep (or else keeps the organism on the alert). Every organism is constantly 
preoccupied with the task of solving problems. These problems arise from its own assessments of its condition and of its environment; 
conditions which the organism seeks to improve. 
      An attempted solution often proves to be misguided, in that it makes things worse.  Then follow further attempts at solution – further 
trial and error movements. 
      We can see that life–even at the level of the unicellular organism–brings something completely new into the world, something that did 
not previously exist: problems and active attempts to solve them; assessments, values: trial and error. 
      It may be supposed that, under the influence of Darwin’s natural selection, it is the most active problem solvers, the seekers and the 
finders, the discoverers of new worlds and new forms of live, that undergo the greatest development. 
      Each organism also strives to stabilize its internal conditions of life and to maintain it’s individuality – an activity whose results biologists 
call ‘homoeostasis’.  Yet this too is an internal agitation, an internal activity: an activity that attempts to restrict the internal agitation, a 
feedback mechanism, a correction of errors.  The homoeostasis must be incomplete. It must restrict itself. Were it completely successful, it 
would mean the death of the organism, or, at the very least, the temporary cessation of all its vital functions. Activity, agitation, search are 
essential for life, for perpetual restlessness, perpetual imperfection; for perpetual seeking, hoping, evaluation, finding, discovering, 
improving, for learning and for the creation of values; but also for perpetual error...  
     Darwinism teaches that organisms become adapted to the environment through natural selection. And it teaches that they are passive 
throughout this process. But it seems to me far more important to stress that the organisms find, invent and reorganize new environments in 
the course of their search for a better world… 
      All organisms are fully occupied with problem-solving. Their first problem is survival. But there are countless concrete problems that arise in 
the most diverse situations. And one of the most important problems is the search for better living conditions: for greater freedom; for a 
better world. 
     According to this optimistic interpretation, it is through natural selection and (we may suppose) through an external selection pressure that 
a strong internal selection pressure comes into being at a very early stage; a selection pressure exerted by the organisms upon their 
environment. This selection pressure manifests itself as a kind of behavior that we may interpret as searching for a new ecological niche. 
Sometimes it is even the construction of a new ecological niche. 
           This pressure from within results in a choice of niches; that is, in forms of behavior that may be regarded as a choice of lifestyles and of 
surrounding. This must be taken to include choice of friends, symbiosis, and above all, perhaps most importantly… the choice of a mate… 
[All italics mine, Popper 1992]. 
- - - . (1999). All life is problem solving [Alles Leben ist Problemlosen.] . London ; New York: Routledge. 
- - - . (1956). Realism and the aim of science (1983, including Popper's introduction from the 1982 edition and Popper's preface from 1956 edition 
ed.). London: Routledge.  
 - - - . (1957). The poverty of historicism (2nd, 2002 ed.). London: Routledge. http://site.ebrary.com.rlproxy.upei.ca/lib/yale/Doc?id=5006152  
 - - - . (1959). The Logic of Scientific Discovery [Logik der Forschung, 1935, Vienna, Austria] . London ; New York: Routledge. 
1. 
The initial stage, the act of conceiving or inventing a theory, seems to me neither to call for logical analysis nor to be susceptible of it. The 
question how it happens that a new idea occurs to a man—whether it is a musical theme, a dramatic conflict, or a scientific theory—may be 
of great interest to empirical psychology; but it is irrelevant to the logical analysis of scientific knowledge. This latter is concerned not with 
questions of fact (Kant’s quid facti?), but only with questions of justification or validity (Kant’s quid juris?). Its questions are of the following 
kind. Can a statement be justified? And if so, how? Is it testable? Is it logically dependent on certain other statements? Or does it perhaps 
contradict them? In order that a statement may be logically examined in this way, it must already have been presented to us. Someone must 
have formulated it, and submitted it to logical examination.  
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Accordingly I shall distinguish sharply between the process of conceiving a new idea, and the methods and results of examining it logically. 
As to the task of the logic of knowledge—in contradistinction to the psychology of knowledge—I shall proceed on the assumption that it 
consists solely in investigating the methods employed in those systematic tests to which every new idea must be subjected if it is to be 
seriously entertained.  
     Some might object that it would be more to the purpose to regard it as the business of epistemology to produce what has been called a 
‘rational reconstruction’ of the steps that have led the scientist to a discovery—to the finding of some new truth. But the question is: what, 
precisely, do we want to reconstruct? If it is the processes involved in the stimulation and release of an inspiration which are to be 
reconstructed, then I should refuse to take it as the task of the logic of knowledge. Such processes are the concern of empirical psychology 
but hardly of logic. It is another matter if we want to reconstruct rationally the subsequent tests whereby the inspiration may be discovered 
to be a discovery, or become known to be knowledge. In so far as the scientist critically judges, alters, or rejects his own inspiration we 
may, if we like, regard the methodological analysis undertaken here as a kind of ‘rational reconstruction’ of the corresponding 
thoughtprocesses. But this reconstruction would not describe these processes as they actually happen: it can give only a logical skeleton of 
the procedure of testing. Still, this is perhaps all that is meant by those who speak of a ‘rational reconstruction’ of the ways in which we gain 
knowledge.  
     It so happens that my arguments in this book are quite independent of this problem. However, my view of the matter, for what it is 
worth, is that there is no such thing as a logical method of having new ideas, or a logical reconstruction of this process. My view may be 
expressed by saying that every discovery contains ‘an irrational element’, or ‘a creative intuition’, in Bergson’s sense. In a similar way 
Einstein speaks of the ‘search for those highly universal laws . . . from which a picture of the world can be obtained by pure deduction. 
There is no logical path’, he says, ‘leading to these . . . laws. They can only be reached by intuition, based upon something like an 
intellectual love (‘Einfühlung’) of the objects of experience.’ (Popper 1959, pp 7-9)  
2.  
(a) The method of the social sciences, like that of the natural sciences, consists in trying out tentative solutions to those problems from 
which our investigations start. Solutions are proposed and criticized. If a proposed solution is not open to objective criticism, then it is 
excluded as unscientific, although perhaps only temporarily.  
(b) If the proposed solution is open to objective criticism, then we attempt to refute it; for all criticism consists in attempts at refutation.  
(c) If a proposed solution is refuted through our criticism we propose another solution.  
(d) If it withstands criticism, we accept it temporarily; and we accept it, above all, as worthy of further discussion and criticism.  
(e) Thus the method of science is one of the tentative attempts (or brain-waves) to solve our problems which are controlled by the most 
severe criticism. It is a critical development of the method of ‘trial and error’.  
(f) The so-called objectivity of science lies in the objectivity of the critical method; that is, above all, in the fact that no theory is exempt 
from criticism, and further, in the fact that the logical instrument of criticism – the logical contradiction – is objective (Popper 1992, pp. 
66-67).  
3. 
It is often difficult enough for the expert, and certainly in many instances impossible for the layman, to distinguish between legitimate and 
illegitimate claims advanced in the name of science…. If we are to safeguard the reputation of science, and to prevent the arrogation of 
knowledge based on a superficial similarity of procedure with that of the physical sciences, much effort will have to be directed toward 
debunking such arrogations, some of which have by now become the vested interests of established university departments. We cannot be 
grateful enough to such modern philosophers of science as Sir Karl Popper for giving us a test by which we can distinguish between what we 
may accept as scientific and what not - a test which I am sure some doctrines now widely accepted as scientific would not pass (Nobel 1974).  
4. 
Emile Zola described a work of art as a corner of nature seen through a temperament. The philosopher Karl Popper, the economist F.A. 
Hayek, and the art historian K. H. Gombrich have shown that the creative process in science and art consists of two main activities: an 
imaginative jumping forward to a new abstraction or simplified representation, followed by a critical looking back to see how nature appears 
in the light of the new vision (Nobel 1978). 
5. 
The New Zealand interlude was… notable because there Eccles met the philosopher, Karl Popper, from whom he learnt the relationship of 
the scientist to hypotheses; how to be daring in developing hypotheses of the greatest generality, and at the same time how to test them with 
the utmost rigour with the consequence either of falsification in whole or in part, or at best corroboration; but never confirmation. He feels 
that this relationship to hypotheses has not only increased his conceptual power, but has also greatly helped emotionally! He can now rejoice even in the 
falsification of a cherished theory, because even this is a scientific success [italics mine] (Nobel 1963).  
5. 
My characteristics as a scientist stem from a non-conformist upbringing, a sense of being something of an outsider, and looking for different 
perceptions in everything from novels, to art to experimental results. I like complexity, and am delighted by the unexpected. Ideas interest 
me. I was influened early on by reading Arthur Koestler and Edward de Bono, and more recently by the writings of Karl Popper... (Nobel 
1996).  
6. 
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Popper believed the “discovery was not a matter of logic” but rather the application of methodology, which fits the discovery of 
cointegration. This insight intrigues me... (Nobel 2003). 
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 Abstract: We investigated the deep-sea fossil record of benthic ostracodes during periods of rapid climate and oceanographic change over 
the past 20,000 years in a core from intermediate depth in the northwestern Atlantic. Results show that deep-sea benthic community 
"collapses" occur with faunal turnover of up to 50% during major climatically driven oceanographic changes. Species diversity as measured 
by the Shannon–Wiener index falls from 3 to as low as 1.6 during these events. Major disruptions in the benthic communities commenced 
with Heinrich Event 1, the Inter-Allerød Cold Period (IACP: 13.1 ka), the Younger Dryas (YD: 12.9–11.5 ka), and several Holocene Bond 
events when changes in deep-water circulation occurred. The largest collapse is associated with the YD/IACP and is characterized by an 
abrupt two-step decrease in both the upper North Atlantic Deep Water assemblage and species diversity at 13.1 ka and at 12.2 ka. The 
ostracode fauna at this site did not fully recover until approximately 8 ka, with the establishment of Labrador Sea Water ventilation. 
Ecologically opportunistic slope species prospered during this community collapse. Other abrupt community collapses during the past 20 ka 
generally correspond to millennial climate events. These results indicate that deep-sea ecosystems are not immune to the effects of rapid 
climate changes occurring over centuries or less. 
 
 Photo: Ostracodes, which are small, clam-shaped crustaceans, have a rich fossil record unlike most deep-sea animals and are an important 
“window” into the ancient history of benthic ecosystems. The various shapes indicate high biodiversity. Yasuhara et al... show that deep-sea 
biodiversity is linked to global climate and has collapsed repeatedly over the past 20,000 years. 
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